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PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS
Łódź, 12-14 May 2023**

BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

Department of English and General Linguistics, Institute of English Studies
University of Łódź

Eighth International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics

PhiLang 2023

Łódź, 12-14 May 2023

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Book of Abstracts

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Lectures

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CAN CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERS BE CONSERVATIVE TOWARDS CONCEPTS?

Conceptual engineers are often depicted as sceptical, or at the very least highly critical, towards conceptual representations. By contrast, the prospects for being a conceptual engineer and a “conceptual conservatist” seem bleak. This talk explores the ways in which conceptual engineering is compatible with a conservatist attitude towards concepts, also drawing analogies from more traditional epistemological debates on belief conservatism.

Keywords: concepts, conceptual engineering, conceptual conservatism

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CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING AND AI: WHAT KIND OF AGENT IS CHATGPT?

Some (but not all) technological transformations put pressures on our core conceptual apparatus. Current development and use of AI is a paradigm. Conceptual Engineering can help us understand and guide these conceptual transformations. In this talk I use our concept of an agent (someone or something that can act) as an illustration.

Keywords: conceptual engineering, artificial intelligence, ChatGPT

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CONCEPTUAL PLURALISM AND GENDER TERMS

In this talk I will discuss conceptual pluralism and its application to gender terms. I will show how a pluralist approach to concepts and conceptual engineering can help resolve the dispute between gender critical feminists (e.g., Stock 2021) and gender identity theorists (e.g., Jenkins 2016) concerning what makes one a woman. I will pay special attention to the distinction between scientific and everyday concepts (Chomsky 2000) and argue that it can help elucidate some important aspects of the dispute. I will also discuss the limits of my intervention and why we often feel that “philosophy leaves everything as it is” (Wittgenstein 2009: §124).

Keywords: conceptual pluralism, gender terms, conceptual engineering

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PRESUPPOSITIONS AND THEIR DIALOGICAL USES – NEGOTIATING AND MANIPULATING THE COMMON GROUND

Presuppositions are normally addressed in linguistics and philosophy of language considering their semantic or epistemic dimension, namely the problems related to their truth-value (Stalnaker 1974; von Stechow 2008), their triggers (and defeasibility) (Levinson 1983), and the interlocutors' knowledge or beliefs of the presupposed content (Gibbs 1987). Their dialogical aspect, however, is relatively neglected. What are presuppositions for in a dialogue, what are their effects on the conversation, and how can they be manipulative? These questions put the aforementioned philosophical and linguistic issues in a different light, and more importantly within a different paradigm defined by the notions of commitment, acceptance, and reasonableness rather than truth-values or knowledge.

The starting point to address the dialogical face of presuppositions is the notion of dialogue. Dialogues are cooperative activities characterized by different purposes (Walton and Krabbe 1995) – such as sharing information, persuading the interlocutor, making a joint decision, or discussing the linguistic and social conditions of the conversation – and subject to distinct types of constraints. The basic requirement for these activities is that the interlocutors share some “grounds” (Clark 1996) – namely they can leave some assumptions unstated as part of what is presumed to be already accepted. However, sometimes the hidden dimension of discourse becomes extremely problematic. Misunderstandings and (deep) disagreements can reveal that what we considered as “common knowledge” is in fact only a presumption that holds within specific cultural boundaries, and can become an instrument, a strategy for manipulating discourse.

The purpose of this presentation is to defend a dialectical approach to presupposition in which this pragmatic/semantic phenomenon is analysed as a dialogical move grounded on an implicit presumptive reasoning. Presupposition is an implicit move in which some commitments are placed into the interlocutor's commitment store as presumptively part of the “common ground.” In this sense, the force of a presupposition lies in the presumptions on which it rests – which can be of different nature and kind. For this reason, presuppositions can be analysed as implicit arguments – and thus be assessed as fallacious or acceptable moves. This theoretical approach can be used for bringing to light the deceptive dimension of some classical fallacies.

Keywords: presuppositions, dialogue, fallacies

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THE SPEAKER-MEANING PICTURE OF CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING

People sometimes intentionally and explicitly adjust how they are using words and/or concepts. Let us call this broad phenomenon ‘conceptual engineering’. Conceptual engineering is commonplace. For example, it takes place whenever theorists, solicitors, policy-makers, medical researchers, activists, etc., try to introduce or refine technical terms and/or concepts. A theory of conceptual engineering should, first and foremost, help us to understand the phenomenon. In this talk, I sketch two theories of conceptual engineering: Herman Cappelen’s Austerity Framework; and my own Speaker-Meaning Picture. I argue that the latter makes much better sense of conceptual engineering than the former.

Keywords: conceptual engineering, Austerity Framework, Speaker-Meaning Picture

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Main

Sessions

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**THE ROLE OF EXPERTS IN CONCEPTUAL IMPLEMENTATION:
A CHALLENGE FOR SOCIALLY SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL KIND CONCEPTS**

According to the standard formulation of the implementation challenge, we are not able to implement concept/meaning revisions, as externalism grounds meanings in facts beyond our control (Cappelen 2018; Deutsch 2020). However, the central role of experts in meaning-fixing in social externalism could provide a solution: by changing the practices of experts, we change the meaning of terms. In this paper, I argue that social externalism does not provide an easy route to conceptual implementation for *socially significant social kind concepts*, and I propose a new formulation of the implementation challenge which focuses on the power dynamics surrounding those concepts. I assume that revisions are proposed by subordinated social groups (Podosky, 2019).

Ball (2019) distinguishes between two understandings of the notion of experts in meaning-fixing: “power metasemantics” (i.e., experts are those who convince us about the meaning of terms), and “virtue metasemantics” (i.e., experts are those who are in a positive epistemic position in relation to the subject matter). I argue that both approaches present difficulties in relation to conceptual implementation for socially significant concepts.

I argue that power metasemantics tends to prevent subordinated groups from bringing about meaning change. Because of testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007), their members are often denied the role of experts. Moreover, due to “meaning-fixing conspiracies” (Ball, 2019) and “indirect testimonial injustice”, even members of privileged groups face challenges when attempting to implement conceptual revisions proposed by subordinated groups. Furthermore, I argue that virtue metasemantics does not provide an objective notion of experts: there are competing groups of experts and people are influenced by their ideological beliefs in choosing the “correct” one.

I conclude that the challenge arising from power metasemantics significantly hinders conceptual implementation for socially significant social kind concepts without making it impossible, while that arising from virtue metasemantics is more sympathetic to Cappelen’s scepticism.

Keywords: conceptual engineering; conceptual implementation; implementation challenge; social externalism; social kind concepts; testimonial injustice.

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SEMANTIC ORIGINALISM AND THE FIXATION OF CONTESTED CONCEPTS

Semantic originalism is the thesis that we need to fix the interpretation of the constitution, and by extension, of any legal text, to its original, semantic meaning. This means that we need to read the constitution as how it would be conventionally understood in the specific language by the time of its enactment.

In this talk I want to assess one major difficulty for semantic originalism: how do we fix the meaning of essentially contested concepts? The meaning such type of concepts is constantly subject of disagreement because of people do not accord the threshold of what it applies to. The paragon is ‘art’: people disagree about which kind of object should be apply to ‘art’. In the US Constitution we find also contested concepts, such as ‘cruel and unusual punishment’, ‘due process’, and ‘equal protection’. If a concept is essentially contested, it does not have a settled meaning and is *a fortiori* unfixable.

Lawrence Solum, having presented the most complete account on semantic originalism, propounds that people could not disagree about the *application* of essentially contested concepts, if they did not agree on its essential meaning. The semantic meaning of such concepts is therefore vague in his account and contain multiple possibilities of interpretation in his account. In other words, the meaning of vague concepts is not exhausted by their semantic interpretation. For that reason, argues Solum, determining the meaning vague concepts of a legal text is not incumbent upon its semantic interpretation.

My contention is that Solum does not provide a justification of the fixation of the original meaning. Rather, his account necessarily implies that there is no *fixed original meaning* of essentially contested concepts.

Keywords: Legal semantics; fixation of meaning; disagreement of meaning in the law; essentially contested concepts; originalism; the semantics of evaluative concepts.

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CONCEPTUALLY ENGINEERING MULTIPLY GROUNDED CONCEPTS

The idea that philosophers and linguists may at times engage in conceptual engineering (as opposed to merely changing our beliefs or formulating theories using already available concepts) has proven attractive in recent years. But as Cappelen and Plunkett put it in a recent volume, if we are to describe our intellectual project as *conceptual* engineering, then “we are ultimately on the hook for an account of what these objects [concepts] are” (2020, p. 7). One approach to this issue has been to stay relatively agnostic on this matter and to focus on spelling out the engineering analogy (e.g., Chalmers, 2020). And yet, it seems important to come to terms with the fact that concepts have more than one explanatory dimension, and that several such dimensions may be of importance for the conceptual engineering project. As such, it is not merely the case that the word “concept” happens to be used with a variety of only superficially related meanings. Rather, it appears to be an essential feature of concepts that they have a layered ontology. Logicians will emphasize the inferential relations between concepts; cognitive psychologists will regard concepts as mental structures instantiated in the brain; historians of ideas will regard them as emerging as cultural products; sociolinguists will regard concepts as affordances of a specific linguistic community. It is clear that a rich theory of the life of concepts needs to account for the interactions between these dimensions. This paper explores the seminal idea that concepts are multiply grounded entities and works out the consequences for the idea of conceptual engineering. For this, it draws on the work of the Danish linguist Peter Harder, who developed the idea that meaning phenomena more generally are grounded in several *partially autonomous* spheres (Harder, 1999 and 2010).

Keywords: multiple grounding, concepts, meaning, conceptual engineering, ontology, functionalism

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DIRECTIVAL THEORY OF MEANING AND CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING

Conceptual engineering is a newly developed and highly popular project within analytic philosophy that seeks to ameliorate, reshape, or eliminate concepts that, in one way or another, seem to function in problematic or otherwise defective ways. One of its main issues concerns the problem of the adequate metasemantic theory. It is often claimed that to understand how meaning change (assumed by various conceptions of conceptual engineering) is even possible, one needs to develop a full-blown conception of what makes our words (and other representational tools) have the meaning they have. Even though some argue that the problem of the metasemantic theory is not that pressing for conceptual engineers (e.g., Nado 2020; Pinder 2021), it is still a widely disputed theoretical issue. However, not equally much attention is paid to the first-order question of an adequate *semantic* theory one needs to employ if conceptual engineering is about to succeed. It is, as I am going to argue, very unfortunate since metasemantic considerations need to go in pair with the question of the appropriate theory of meaning. The theory that might help to fulfil this gap is, as I will try to show, the directival theory of meaning. That old conception developed in the thirties by the Polish philosopher and logician Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1931; 1934) has recently regained some popularity (cf. Grabarczyk 2017; 2019). In my talk, I am going to argue that the directival theory has certain merits for conceptual engineering, as it fits nicely with a normative conception of language presupposed by the conceptual engineers, does not determine what *metasemantic* theory is the correct one, and provides a plain and useful criterion of successful concept-engineering.

Keywords: conceptual engineering, meaning, directival theory of meaning, semantic theory, metasemantic theory

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PROPOSITIONAL CONTENTS AS FORMS

The aim of this paper is to present an outline of a potentially novel theory of propositions. The dominant accounts of propositional contents take them to be structured entities (cf. Russell (1903), Ajdukiewicz (1967), King (2007), Soames (2015), Kawczyński (2017), Hodgson (2021)). The accounts, although significantly differing in details, face serious challenges: some individuate propositional contents too finely predicting that, for instance, statements like “ $a = b$ ” and “ $b = a$ ” express different propositions (King (2007)), some involve paradoxes (e.g. Ciecierski (2011)), they have problems with dealing with cases of uninstantiated types or are committed to perplexing entities like non-enduring products (cf. Bronzo (2020)). It may be worthy to propose a theory of propositional contents that is free of at least some of the aforementioned problems and which is capable of encompassing as many merits of competing theories as possible. In order to make the first step in that direction I shall make a distinction between the concept of structure (of a proposition) as used in structural accounts of propositional contents and the concept of form (of a proposition). The distinction is inspired by ideas of propositional or meaning structures developed by Bolzano (Bolzano (1837/2014)), Church (Church (1954)), and Katz and Fodor (Katz, Fodor (1963)). The proposal I shall present assumes that the structure of a proposition provides a decomposition of a proposition into a certain set of terminal elements. Although “syntactically” simple (decomposition in question may be (in the proper sense) syntactic on some accounts and non-syntactic on others), some elements in question might be conceptually complex. If this is the case, an implicit conceptual structure of the element in question may contain other conceptual constituents. They, in turn, may have complex constituents that exhibit certain conceptual structures etc. We might call such a conceptual structure of concept its analytic structure (on this account concepts may have several analytic structures). Now the propositional form may be defined as a class of all equivalent syntactic structures with at least one analytic structure of one of terminal elements of one of the syntactic structures from the class in question. The idea of propositions as forms takes them to be propositional forms thusly defined. Conceived in that manner the form is the possibility of structure (although not in the sense of Wittgenstein). This abstract idea of propositions as forms might be developed in several ways. The crucial question that differentiates between various accounts of the idea concerns a presupposed theory of concepts and analytic structure. I shall argue that the best approach one might take here is a heterogenous one that enables various kinds of analytic structures for different kinds of concepts. For instance, some concepts might have a classical structure with sufficient and necessary conditions of application, others might have axiomatic or recursive structures, and others a non-classical prototype-oriented structures (other options are possible as well). I shall close the

paper by discussing the merits of the theory, especially its application to the problem of fine-graininess of content.

Keywords: structured propositions, contents, fine-graininess of content, concepts, form and structure

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**COUNTERSENSE OR NONCONTINGENCY:
THE LOGICALITY OF LANGUAGE HYPOTHESIS**

Focusing on the syntactic acceptability of contradictory propositions such as (1)–(3), philosophers like Carnap (cf. Bar-Hillel 1954), Croce, and Husserl (cf. Bar-Hillel 1957) concluded for the indifference of syntax to logical considerations. Borrowing Husserl’s lexicon, if countersense is grammatical, then syntax (that shall avoid nonsense, *Unsinn*) does not interface with logic (that shall avoid countersense, *Widersinn*).

- (1) It is raining and it is not raining
- (2) This round table is squared
- (3) All quadrilaterals have 5 vertices

Wittgenstein, in proposition 4.461 of the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, explicitly states that both tautologies and contradictions say nothing (*nichts sagen*), because they lack sense (*sind sinnlos*). As a result, the syntactic acceptability or unacceptability of tautologies has to be taken into consideration. As one has grammatical contradictions, such as (1)–(3), one also has grammatical tautologies, such as (4)–(6).

- (4) It is raining or it is not raining
- (5) If John is wrong, then he is wrong
- (6) War is war

Recent work in linguistics argues for the “logicality” of language (Gajewski 2002, 2009; Fox, Hackl 2006; Chierchia 2013; Abrusán 2014; Del Pinal 2019, 2021). Informally, it is the idea that syntax *does* interface with logic to the point that *some* linguistic structures do not reach the level of sententiality because of logical considerations. Chief evidence in support of this hypothesis comes from ungrammaticalities, such as (7) and (8), due to the logical status of the word-sequence.

- (7) *Someone but John smokes (von Stechow 1984)
- (8) *There is every fly in my soup (Barwise, Cooper 1981)

(7) is associated with a contradictory content, whilst (8) is associated with a tautological content. However, *if* logical considerations are relevant for syntactic formation, why should some tautologies, i.e., «something very precious to the philosopher or mathematician» (von Stechow 1984: 34), be sanctioned with ungrammaticality?

Keywords: countersense, nonsense, tautologies, contradictions, language logicality

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CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING, REFERENCE MAGNETISM, AND INFERENCEALISM

Reference Magnetism, as developed by Lewis (1983) and Sider (2011), is a widely popular metasemantic theory, on which the reference of terms is partly determined by the relative naturalness (eligibility) of candidates for the terms' reference. My aim is to argue that proponents of reference magnetism should understand conceptual engineering projects as attempts to change the inferential role of terms. I intend to show that the metasemantic framework provided by reference magnetism gives us a good model for understanding certain paradigmatic examples of conceptual engineering (e.g., the famous Clark and Chalmers (1998) argument to revise our concept of belief to account for their Extended Mind hypothesis). Roughly, the project of Chalmers and Clark can be interpreted within the reference-magnetic framework as the proposal that the property that accords with the Extended Mind hypothesis is more joint-carving than other candidates for the reference of 'belief'. However, if reference magnetism is true, then conceptual engineering cannot be interpreted as an attempt to revise a concept's reference. If Chalmers and Clark outline the joint-carving notion of belief, then according to reference magnetism, the term 'belief' as we currently use it (despite what we might think) already refers to that notion; the joint-carving property acts as a reference magnet despite the (partially) wrong theory of *belief* our linguistic community might have. Therefore, proponents of reference magnetism should interpret conceptual engineering projects as attempts to revise the inferential role that the engineered concept plays within the linguistic community. More specifically, I argue that the revisions proposed by conceptual engineers consist in revising the inferential role of a concept, so that it more adequately describes the joint-carving (natural) property that constitutes the concept's reference. Thus, fans of reference magnetism and conceptual engineering should be inferentialists.

Keywords: Conceptual Engineering, Reference Magnetism, Inferentialism, Naturalness, Reference

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**WHY (UN)INTENTIONALITY EXPONENTS HAVE DIFFERENT USAGE
CONDITIONS IN SENTENCES WITH DIFFERENT COMMUNICATIVE
STRUCTURES, AND WHAT IT CAN MEAN FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION**

In the philosophy-of-action works dealing with the attribution of (non-)intentionality, little attention is paid to the topic-comment organization of sentences of the form *X (un)intentionally did a*, that is, what is commented in such sentences seems to be treated as obvious in them. Yet sentences like this, formally identical and *prima facie* describing the same situation, are usually ambiguous as regards the state of affairs they comment on. That means that they may differ truth-conditionally from one another, which in turn may lead to different conclusions concerning the application of (un)intentionality exponents. My argument is based on the observation that such adverbs are not so much comments on the action itself as on the effects of that action and predicating them is possible only if one can indicate or at least assume the presence of some intentional/basic action that finally gave that result, whether intentional or not. There are 3 types of structures: first, the entire VP points to the commented effect, and the “actional background” is implicit or expressed by a subordinate clause; second, VP indicates an action itself, and the effect (intentional or not) is implicit, stated additionally or – in intentional structures – expressed by a purpose clause; third, VP is divided between an action and effect. The latter has its variants, depending on the number of complements/modifiers, which can belong either to the action-part or the effect-part. The point is that the recipient should understand exactly which semantic variant of the structure the speaker has in mind – or it will only seem to them both that they are talking about the same thing. Various linguistic means serve this purpose, including communicative organization of sentences (the component representing the effect is typically focal, though it is often not clear in writing). Moreover, sentences of the form *X (un)intentionally did a* (focalizing a verb or one of VP components) and *X did a (un)intentionally* (focalizing an adverb) differ significantly in their implications, which I comment on selected examples.

Keywords: communicative organization of sentences, focus, intentionality exponents, semantics

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NATURAL LANGUAGE ONTOLOGY: A DEFENCE OF THE CONCEPT-LINGUISTIC ONTOLOGY ENCLOSED IN NATURAL LANGUAGES

In the field of contemporary ontology, it is often assumed that natural language is an adequate guide to disentangle the existence of entities. However, one of the main problems that are raised in this discipline is precisely that of finding out what is the best criterion of ontological commitment to apply. *Natural Language Ontology* (NLO), promoted by Moltmann (2013, 2017, 2020, 2022), offers a rich alternative for the analysis of the conceptual ontologies reflected in natural languages.

Although it is a developing discipline, it is possible to say with Moltmann (2017, 2020, 2022) that it is framed at the intersection between metaphysics and linguistics. Its main aim is to analyse natural language in search of the entities that lie beneath it, i.e., the ontology that a speaker accepts when using his or her language (Moltmann, 2017, p. 1).

As this perspective is based on the analysis of language as it is used by speakers, it belongs to *descriptive metaphysics* (Strawson, 1959). This metaphysical conception is devoted solely to uncovering the implicit commitments of natural languages, as opposed to a *revisionist metaphysics* that would seek to improve the structure of the theory.

To be able to describe these ontological commitments, it is necessary to have a deep knowledge of the categories and structures of natural languages. This is why contributions from the field of linguistics are as indispensable as metaphysics.

As we said, what is relevant for NLO is to describe ontological commitments as they occur in natural languages. This analysis makes it possible to highlight the ontological-conceptual differences between languages, which in turn can influence speakers' cognition. NLO is not about what we can do with language, but about what languages do with us.

Keywords: Ontology; ontological commitments; natural language; descriptive metaphysics; linguistic relativity.

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THE NORM OF INFORMATIVENESS FOR ASSERTIONS

There is a widespread agreement that assertions are our primary source of information. Nevertheless, there is a deep disagreement concerning how the informativeness of assertions should be understood—this thesis can receive two readings:

STRONG INFO Assertions essentially deliver *new* information.

WEAK INFO Assertions essentially deliver information.

By STRONG INFO (e.g., Searle 1969; Stalnaker 1978; García-Carpintero 2004; Pagin 2011), a proper assertion should introduce a new piece of information into the common ground. By WEAK INFO, an assertion that p can be proper even if p is already part of the common ground; thus, it makes space for uninformative assertions.

My talk will consist of three parts. In the first part, I argue for STRONG INFO and defend it against recent criticisms (e.g., Montminy 2020; Willard-Kyle 2021). Following the normative approach to speech acts (e.g., Williamson 2000; García-Carpintero 2004; Goldberg 2015), I propose a norm of informativeness such that one's assertion that p is proper only if, at the time of uttering p , p does not belong to common ground. Finally, I extend these considerations to non-assertoric speech acts.

Arguing for STRONG INFO shows that there is a class of uninformative speech acts that is left out—this is the subject of the second part of my talk. I map uninformative content along two dimensions, i.e., primary and secondary. I analyse speech acts, like reminding, that do not provide new information into the common ground (Abbot 2008; cf. Stalnaker 2008; Clapp 2020).

In the final part, I show how focusing on uninformative content is relevant to the debate concerning lying, specifically, I will argue that we can lie with uninformative content. I end with a discussion of how this conclusion is problematic for some definitions of lying.

Keywords: Assertion; informativeness; speech acts; normative account; lying

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THE MANY GUISES OF CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING

I argue that conceptual engineering comes in many guises, often depending on what type of concept is being engineered. Engineering a classical concept, one that stems from Plato and Frege, is very different from engineering, e.g., a prototype concept or an exemplar concept. The former are abstract and have necessary and sufficient satisfaction conditions. The latter, on the other hand, can and do differ from one person to the next and thus have the earmarks of conceptions. An important worry about conceptual engineering stems from what Herman Cappelen calls the Strawsonian Challenge; namely that one revises a concept then one is in danger of changing the subject, resulting perhaps in the discussants talking past each other. While the challenge might apply to classical concepts, it is unlikely to affect other types of concepts. For example, prototype and exemplar concepts do acknowledge that concepts vary from one person to the next as well as over time. It becomes important, then, to clarify what it is that secures the sameness of topic for such concepts. I will draw on Putnam and suggest that a *same as* relation goes a long way towards doing so.

While it is tempting to argue that classical concepts are of natural kinds while prototype and/or exemplar concepts are of socially constructed kinds, the paper argues that such classification is not tenable. Many of our concepts of natural kinds are prototype concepts, and many socially constructed kinds are specified with necessary and sufficient conditions and so are examples of classical concepts. Finally, it depends on what kind of a concept we are dealing with whether it is possible to engineer it, and if it is possible, how one engineers it. Different rules of operation apply to, e.g., engineering classical concepts and prototype concepts.

Keywords: Conceptual engineering, Classical concepts, Prototype concepts, Exemplar concepts, Conceptions, Natural kind concepts, Socially constructed concepts

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**THE LITERAL-METAPHORICAL DISTINCTION WITHOUT
(LEXICALIZED) CONCEPTS?**

We routinely distinguish between literal and metaphorical uses of language. For example, we can quickly identify “the largest fish in the aquarium is a shark” as literal and “my lawyer is a shark” as metaphorical. We grasp the former by knowing the conventional meaning of the words. The latter we grasp by inferring what is meant beyond the conventional meaning of the words. This intuitive literal-metaphorical distinction is backed by lexical semantics which views metaphorical meaning as deviant. Literal meaning is conventional and non-deviant. Conventional meanings of words correspond to lexicalized concepts. By contrast, lexical pragmaticists (LPs) places metaphor on a continuum with literally loose uses of speech, where deviance is the rule, not the exception. This has led certain proponents of LP (most prominently, Sperber & Wilson, 2008) to abandon the literal-metaphorical distinction. Allot & Textor (2017; 2022) develop a version of the literal-metaphorical distinction that does not rely on lexicalized concepts and conventional word meanings. On their view, non-literal language use is contrasted with “originating use.” We generally agree that there is a need to preserve the literal-metaphorical distinction despite the pervasiveness of lexical modulation. We analyse metaphorical uses of proper names (see Authors, Date, *forthcoming*) to further substantiate this distinction. Still, we disagree that the literal-metaphorical distinction can be convincingly preserved without invoking lexicalized concepts. One major issue we flag with the authors’ account is the vagueness of their term “originating use.” We canvass several possible candidate criteria for this term. We conclude none are satisfactory for preserving the notion of deviance. We motivate a notion of deviance based on a neoclassical understanding of concepts (Leben, 2015). From this, we develop criteria for deviance that distinguishes metaphorical from literal-loose lexical modulations.

Keywords: Metaphor; Literal-Metaphorical divide; Lexicalized Concepts; Originating use; Metaphorical Uses of Proper Names; Lexical Pragmatics

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COLLABORATIVE CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING: LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY

Cappelen (2017) wrote that Conceptual Engineering is something philosophers are “better equipped to do than linguists”. I aim to show that linguists do, and should, have a place in CE. More precisely, we can either bring philosophy into linguistics, or linguistics into philosophy. This talk will demonstrate and argue for both avenues.

To bring CE into linguistics, linguists can use empirical linguistic tools to help evaluate the extent to which engineered terms are successfully implemented and diffused. To exemplify this, I use the case study of *mass* and *weight* in the Early Modern scientific register, which I argue is an instance of CE, and track their implementation through 220 years of journal articles. Through examination using Ctrees and Random Forests I concluded this instance of CE was not successfully implemented, despite targeting a small, ideologically niche community with shared goals. I argue the tools used in this analysis should be applied to CE more widely.

To bring linguistics into CE, a different approach is needed. Instead, linguists can bring knowledge of the dynamic nature of concepts in discourse. Through focussing on the co-construction of meaning in conversation, it is possible to investigate the pragmatic processes involved in the inferential work that leads to the recovery of intended and inferred concepts. This is illustrated through a corpus-based investigation of discourse at the micro-level to analyse how speakers do things with concepts that can lead to conceptual revision. This relationship should not be a one-way street; linguistic theories of co-construction of meaning will also need adjusting using the ideas of normativity and ethics involved in CE.

It will be concluded that both avenues are fruitful, and that involving linguistics in CE will help promote and further the field despite initial resistance from both philosophers and linguists on grounds of prescriptivism.

Keywords: Interface of philosophy and linguistics, co-construction of meaning, scientific discourse, conceptual analysis, philosophy of language and metaethics.

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**SUPERVALUATIONISM ABOUT VAGUE NAMES CANNOT ACCOUNT FOR
STATEMENTS ABOUT THOSE NAMES**

Vague names, like 'Everest' and 'Belle Epoque' seem to refer to objects without clear boundaries. Supervaluationism is one theory which claims that this vagueness is a feature of language, not of the objects referred to—in particular, vagueness in names is just ambiguity between many possible referents. This general idea admits of two more specific versions. Both give similar treatments of standard uses of vague names, but have very different results for other cases, such as reference achieved by descriptions including mentioned names. Considering two examples, I show that neither variant of supervaluationism can account for the truth of all types of sentences *about those names themselves*. If I am right that these two types exhaust the possibilities for supervaluationism, then theory is shown to be false.

Keywords: vagueness, names, supervaluationism, reference, use/mention

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THE NOTION OF HABIT IN THE WORK OF BENJAMIN LEE WHORF

There are four main features that define the notion of habit that can be inferred from the classical pragmatist philosophers postulates (Dewey, 1922; James, 1890): *plasticity*, *transactionality*, *mechanization* and *imperceptibility*. In the first place, the fact that habits are *plastic* implies that they are *receptive* and *resistant* to change, that is, on the one hand, they accept changes and modifications, and, on the other hand, they only allow such transformations to a certain extent, without becoming something different. Secondly, habits are built in a dynamic relationship with the environment, meaning that, in the human world, they are generated and maintained in a particular culture and form of life. Thirdly, *mechanization* implies that they operate automatically, which leads, finally, to their *imperceptibility*, that is, we are usually not aware of them.

If we transfer this characterization of the notion of habit to the field of Linguistic Relativity, we obtain a reformulation of the Whorfian postulates (Whorf, 1956): linguistic habits generate cognitive habits (Blanco Salgueiro, 2017). The grammar of our language, as understood by Whorf, could then be equated with our linguistic habits which, to begin with, are *mechanical* and therefore *imperceptible*. It is also essential for relativistic positions—for both Whorf and Neo-Whorfians—to highlight the importance of linguistic diversity, which implies that our linguistic habits are generated and constructed in a particular culture in a transactional or feedback relationship with the environment. Finally, the *plasticity* of our grammar implies both that it is *resistant* to change – that is why we project our grammatical patterns in other languages and in the world thinking that they represent it objectively – and that it is *receptive*, that is, it allows us to learn other languages and along with them different linguistic habits. Therefore, what Whorf proposed is that it is these linguistic habits, particular and different for each language, which generate diverse cognitive habits.

Keywords: habit, Linguistic Relativity, cognitive habits, linguistic habits, Whorfianism

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**BETWEEN RATIONALISM AND RELATIVISM - IN SEARCH OF *TERTIUM DATUM*
BY PERELMAN AND HABERMAS**

In the first part of the presentation, I will focus on the view of argumentation in Chaim Perelman's concept of the *New Rhetoric*, which is a rehabilitation of practical reason. I will discuss the interlocutory nature and key role of the construct of the universal audience, suspended between (1) the speaker's peculiar subjective mental construct, determined by rationality based on his cognitive capacities in the process of projecting and finding in himself the so-called state of "carrying another self" (as E. Levinas puts it), and (2) independent universality leading to the ideal of rationality in discourse using arguments of "universal quality" (a term taken from R. Siltal). I will trace the characteristics of the relationship between a speaker and his audience and analyse what Perelman meant claiming that legal reasoning cannot be reduced to a simple syllogism, since it necessarily contains an evaluative element in the form of value judgements (appeals to moral principles or the social good).

In part two, I will focus on J. Habermas' theory of communicative rationality, which aims to achieve a rational consensus characterized by intersubjective validity through an appropriate procedure. The necessary condition for its existence is an ideal communicative situation (*ideale Sprechsituation*). I will examine the prerequisites it requires.

Finally, I will conclude that, both authors form a kind of *tertium datur* between rationalism and relativism, reason and will. I will contrast their concepts, trying to prove some similarities, including the fact that both emphasize argumentation as the central procedural element of speech.

Keywords: Perelman's *New Rhetoric*, universal audience, J. Habermas, communicative rationality, ideal speech situation, practical reason

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HOW TERMS PERTAINING TO HIGHLY SPECIALISED DISCOURSES ARE COINED?

Consider the meaning of terms such as “boson” or “sarcoidosis.” It is hardly controversial that laypeople have little-to-no knowledge concerning the actual meaning of such specialist terms (at best, they can say that sarcoidosis is a disease and boson is some particle.) Tyler Burge (1979, 1986, 1988, 1989, 2003) has convincingly shown that not the community as a whole, but rather relevant experts play an essential role in determining the meaning of such specialist terms. Normative inferentialism is a vividly discussed view in the philosophy of language and it is considered an important alternative to more traditional representational semantics. It is an essentially social theory that emphasizes the role community plays in determining linguistic meaning and claims that communal inferential rules are constitutive of expression’s meanings. So, the question arises how it is possible for the normative inferentialist to take into account Burgean insights concerning the essential role of experts in determining linguistic meaning. Up to date, inferentialists have been preoccupied with accounting for meaning of ordinary words (like “father” or “red”) or logical vocabulary within the inferentialist framework and have largely ignored highly specialised discourses. This article fills that gap. I demonstrate how normative inferentialism can account for the linguistic community’s reliance on experts in determining the meaning of specialist terms. I argue that for specialist terms like “boson” or “sarcoidosis,” the meaning-constitutive rules for inferences must resonate throughout the *community of relevant experts*, such as physicists or medical doctors. I demonstrate that, in principle, such resonating of rules among experts can have two forms: “formal” and “spontaneous.” Third, I argue that there are in fact no two meanings of a specialist term (one that can be attributed to laypeople and the other that can be ascribed to experts.) Furthermore, I consider what happens when one term pertains to more than one area of expertise (for example, “tomato” can pertain to multiple discourses: culinary, biological, legal.)

Keywords: specialist terms, normative inferentialism, Burge, Brandom, semantic externalism

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NORMATIVE COMMON GROUND

Normative language and the trouble it causes have recently directed some discussions away from the semantic-pragmatic grounds and towards the conversational dynamic-oriented realm.

In particular, the problem with providing a satisfactory account of normative disagreement, has led some authors to switch from looking exclusively at what gets expressed (propositions, non-doxastic attitudes?) and how (semantic entailment, implicature, presupposition?), to what happens on the conversational scoreboard when two speakers are disagreeing about what's right, beautiful or tasty (Khoo & Knobe 2016, Pérez Carballo & Santorio 2016, Karczevska 2021). These accounts focus on the data suggesting that even if speakers do not share the relevant norms or standards, they can still, intuitively, be taken to disagree. The details of these accounts are very different but what they have in common is that each offers an image of normative utterances as somehow distinct in the way they modify the common ground of the conversation.

In a recent paper, Teresa Marques (2021) presents a few objections to the Khoo & Knobe and Pérez Carballo & Santorio papers. She argues that even though there is a need for an account of communication along the lines of what they propose, the ones mentioned above suffer from some shortcomings. One is that they are based on the Stalnakerian notion of propositional acceptance, which is insufficient to account for the different attitude modes that create the normative common ground. Another is that they do not do justice to the different illocutionary effects that can update the context. In my talk I offer an account of normative common ground and update which aims at addressing these worries.

Keywords: common ground, normative disagreement, illocution

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BIOSEMANTICS IS METASEMANTICS

Traditionally understood semantics is supposed to explain what the meaning of a word is (e.g., inferential role, connotation, Fregean sense etc). According to Millikan's biosemantics meaning is determined by proper functions of the system that uses the meaning. A meaningful message is always sent from a producer to a consumer. For Millikan what mainly determines meaning are the proper functions of the consumer system and these functions derive from the history of natural selection of organisms that are consumers. Biosemantics has been criticised for its insufficiency in explaining the determination of meaning. One of the objections to biosemantics reveals that the ascriptions of functions are not enough determined themselves to determine meanings. The indeterminacy is usually illustrated with the famous example of a toad hunting for a worm-like shaped piece of cardboard. Opponents of biosemantics claim that the theory is not able to determine whether the animal misinterprets the cardboard as meaning 'food' or rather correctly interpret the cardboard as meaning 'something worm-like.' In my paper I am going to defend biosemantics, however, not with the standard methodology of arguing that the indeterminacy argument is invalid. My aim is to show that it is inappropriate to treat biosemantics as a traditionally understood semantics. Instead of that I propose to consider biosemantics as metasemantics - more precisely, as something that Burgess&Sherman [2014] call 'basic metasemantics.' Basic metasemantics attempts to explain where semantic properties come from: what kind of facts have to occur so that the semantic properties could appear. In other words: in virtue of what expressions obtain their semantic properties. I will argue that biosemantics has a lot to offer when it is interpreted as a metasemantic - rather than semantic - theory; as well as that it avoids the problem of indeterminacy when is treated this way.

Keywords: biosemantics, metasemantics, Millikan, teleosemantics, indeterminacy, meaning

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CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING AND THE WRONG KIND OF REASONS

There is a discussion in meta-ethics about the so-called *wrong kind of reasons*. These are those considerations for performing an action or forming an attitude that fail to bear on its internal standards of correctness. For example, the fact that an evil demon threatens to punish me unless I admire him might count broadly in favour of admiring him but is still a wrong kind of reason for doing so because it is unrelated to the relevant features that the internal standards of admiration require the demon to possess to be admirable. Simion (2018) has recently argued that there are the wrong kind of reasons for engineering concepts. She argues that concepts are epistemic tools whose central function is to represent the world without epistemic loss and, therefore, to engineer concepts in response to non-epistemic considerations is to engineer them for the wrong kind of reasons.

The objective of my paper is to show that Simion's argument is unsuccessful. The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, I argue that Simion is wrong to assume that the claim that concepts are representational tools entails that they are epistemic tools because representation may also serve a lot of non-epistemic purposes. Next, I show that Simion cannot justify the primacy of epistemic considerations on the grounds that the concepts that represent the world without epistemic loss are the most metaphysically 'joint carving' ones. Finally, I argue that even if Simion's assumption is correct, it is dubious whether the considerations that bear on the internal standards of engineering concepts are only those that conform to their central function. I argue that the internal standards of engineering a concept recommend engineering it so that it serves its central function satisfactorily but only to the extent to which this function makes it an all-things-considered valuable tool.

Keywords: conceptual engineering, the wrong kind of reasons, the standards of correctness, conceptual function, conceptual representation, joint-carvingness, non-epistemic reasons

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**DEFLATING PREDICATIVISM: SYNTACTIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST
PREDICATIVISM ABOUT PROPER NAMES**

Predicativists claim that proper names are predicates in all of their occurrences (Fara 2015). The analysis is based on one of two conditions. For Fara it is:

(BCC) ‘N ’is true of a thing just in case it is called N.

where N stands for a predicate. BCC is an adequate analysis of proper names, providing the name itself in fact occurs as a predicate in the naming construction (‘called N’). Alternative versions of predicativism are based on BBCC (Geurts 1997, Bach 2002, Burge 1973, Elbourne 2005, Tayebi 2018):

(BBCC) For every name N, N is true of a thing just in case it is called N.

In BBCC the letter N stands for a variable ranging over quoted names. There is a syntactic difference between the conditions – if N in ‘called N ’stands for a predicate (like in BCC), this means that there are truly predicative uses of proper names — those in naming constructions — and that all occurrences of proper names are reduced to them.

I will argue against Matushansky’s (2008) small clause treatment of proper names in naming constructions (small clause hypothesis (SCH)), which constitutes predicativists’ key argument for BCC. The premise she relies upon is:

Cross-linguistic uniformity (CLU): The structure that verbs of naming (and nomination) project is invariant across languages. (Matushansky 2006)

I use linguistic evidence from Polish to argue against CLU and thus against SCH. In short, in Polish the case of names in naming constructions is not the predicate case (instrumental) but the nominative. Yet, if there are no good arguments for treating BCC as the preferred clause, one can rely upon BBCC to explain away the predicative occurrences of proper names, without assuming that the name is a non-reducible predicate.

Keywords: predicativism, proper names, small clause hypothesis, referentialism, syntactic arguments

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CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING AS PROTOTYPE ENGINEERING

Conceptual engineering (CE) consists in the modification of our representational devices, mostly taken to be concepts. However, it is still controversial how to make sense of concepts within the debate on CE. I sketch an account of concepts where one of their dimensions is a prototype dimension. Accordingly, I want to extend the picture of CE by presenting a new way to understand CE, namely as a form of prototype-engineering. This turns out to be a fruitful perspective on CE.

According to the prototype theory, concepts are mentally structured not in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions but in the form of prototypes, that is, as some sort of typical representative of a category. This implies that prototype membership is *gradual* instead of being strictly categorical as it is the case within the classical theory of concepts. Conceptual boundaries within the prototype theory are assumed to be fuzzy: the prototype of DOG might be a shepherd, but a Chihuahua is similar enough to that prototype in order to be part of the concept DOG. This picture of concepts makes room for conceptual change quite naturally. Since prototype membership is gradual anyway, boundaries can be shifted without a loss of the identity of the concept. Statistically prominent features can become less relevant, while peripheral features can become more prominent. What needs to be modified in order to engineer prototypes are the sources for learning prototypes, since we learn prototypes based on the samples we get in touch with.

After outlining this account, I show how it offers a strong reply to the objection against CE of a change of subject. From that reply, some limits of the account become clear, which I will discuss in a final section.

Keywords: conceptual engineering; concepts; prototype theory; change of subject

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**ON THE MEANING-MAKING FUNCTION OF METAPHORS,
OR LANGUAGE AS A MACHINE AND AS A LIVING ORGANISM**

Metaphors make it possible to make sense of human experience both in conventional communication and in specialist discourses of ideas and sciences, as well as shape responses to various specific issues in those areas. They are vital for the understanding of ecology, disease, learning and acquisition of knowledge, the universe, the mind, etc. Since its early applications in the 18th century, the metaphor of a machine has become the dominant form of our perception of reality. Not only has it strongly influenced the views of economics and politics, but it has also affected the perceptions of language and linguistic communication. Since the 1980s the cognitive linguistic paradigm has sought to show the inadequacy of its use in the description of language. The present paper subscribes to this position and attempts to show which tenets of cognitive linguistics draw on the metaphor of a living organism and why they give a more convincing description of language and linguistic communication.

Keywords: communication, language, living organism, machine, metaphor.

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CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING AND THE METAPHORIC PROCESS

Conceptual engineering has been characterized as a project aimed, on the one hand, at fixing, revising, and improving defective or deficient concepts (*conceptual re-engineering*), and on the other hand, at creating new concepts to replace ill-suited ones (*de novo conceptual engineering*) (Chalmers, 2020). Pinder (2021) has argued that conceptual engineering operates at the level of speaker-meaning, and that where a term semantically-means p , a speaker engages in conceptual engineering with respect to that term by making explicit, by means of a definition, that she will speaker-mean p' by that term in local contexts. I argue for two related claims in this paper: one, that the *Speaker-meaning picture of conceptual engineering* articulated by Pinder (2021) is characteristic of the use of metaphor, and that, two, since the metaphoric process often involves two concepts, conceptual engineering can be understood as revising or refining a concept *in light of* another concept. This attention to dual or multiple concepts in the engineering process has not received much consideration in the literature. The relationship between conceptual engineering and the metaphoric process presents two interesting results: one, conceptual engineering can be pursued without the underlying assumption that the concepts to be engineered are defective; and hence, two, in addition to *conceptual re-engineering* and *de novo conceptual engineering*, conceptual engineers *qua* engineers should also focus on the *maintenance* of concepts.

Keywords: conceptual engineering, semantic meaning, speaker-meaning, metaphor, metaphoric process, Mark Pinder

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CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING, SEMANTIC EXTERNALISM, AND EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY

The project of mapping the role of experimental methods in conceptual engineering is well underway. Work has not yet, however, mapped the role of experimental methods in identifying defective meaning or reference on semantic externalist frameworks of conceptual engineering. In this talk, I explore the epistemology of semantic externalism and argue that any semantic externalist conceptual engineer interested in accurately determining the semantic properties of a potentially defective word should be employing empirical methods instead of armchair methods.

Semantic properties, according to semantic externalists, are grounded by contingent historical, social, and/or natural facts. Because these are abstract and external to language users, individual language users only ever encounter token instantiations of the grounds of meaning. For example, we may only encounter a few hundred instantiations of a causal-historical chain over the course of our lifetime without ever encountering the corresponding anchoring event. Similar epistemic barriers exist between other putative semantic grounds such as linguistic norms or magnetic natural kinds.

This puts armchair semantic externalist conceptual engineering on bad epistemic footing. When examining such extra-personal linguistic practices and traditions, the armchair is susceptible to idiosyncrasies of a person's idiolect and community as well as linguistic fallacies such as the fallacy of the recent (where linguistic changes are judged to be more recent than they truly are) or the etymological fallacy (where etymology is taken as an exclusive guide to present meaning). Instead, semantic facts for the semantic externalist are in remit of lexicography, experimental linguistics, or even fields like biology and chemistry. Such methods allow semantic externalist conceptual engineers to more directly investigate the grounds of meaning than they can from the armchair.

Therefore, semantic externalist conceptual engineers need to integrate experimental frameworks into their practice, else they risk inaccurate or deficient understandings of what they are trying to engineer.

Keywords: conceptual engineering, semantic externalism, semantics, experimental philosophy, metaphilosophy, epistemology

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CAN CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERS IMPLEMENT CONCEPTS? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION

Conceptual engineering is fundamentally purpose-driven, and so it only succeeds if it manages to change cognitive or linguistic entities. At the same time, it is ultimately an empirical question whether it is possible to even implement revised concepts in the first place as well as what the best methods are for propagating concepts. Nonetheless, extant work has only speculated on the answers to those two questions. To fill this gap, this talk will present first-of-its kind experimental research directly testing the possibility of conceptual revision using DINOSAUR and PLANET.

In the study, we exploited the disconnect between scientists' and folk's concepts of DINOSAUR and PLANET to measure the effect interventions have on participants' conceptual content. We gave participants an initial intervention and then in a second survey (masked for its true purpose), we collected participants' default context-less judgements about the concepts.

In total, 720 participants saw one of two versions of either an intervention of DINOSAUR or PLANET and 540 participants (75%) completed the masked post-test (after 12 participants were removed for seeing past our masking). 360 other participants in the control condition also took one of three post-test measures without any pre-test intervention.

When compared to the control group, we only found signs of revised conceptual content in DINOSAUR in 1 of 3 measures but saw signs of revision in PLANET in 3 of 3 measures of conceptual content. Moreover, interventions that used pictures in addition to text worked better than interventions that only included text.

Thus, we found that conceptual revision is possible, but difficult. While this is an important proof of concept – conceptual implementation is both possible and possible to measure – we have also shown that further experimental conceptual engineering work is needed to disentangle the different variables standing in the way of successful propagation.

Keywords: conceptual engineering, experimental philosophy, conceptual propagation, conceptual content, implementation challenge

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WHAT IS WHAT IN A MEME? AN INTERNET MEME AS A CONCEPT

An internet meme can be casually understood as a bimodal/multimodal entity that spreads among internet users due to its humorous potential. Being placed within a social, cultural, or political context, memes are mostly created for the sake of satirical commentary, reflection, local understanding of a given phenomenon. They are referred to as being viral since they spread rapidly just like viruses and thus can be “contagious” due to their easy replicability. However, the virality of a meme does not typically last long: memes are ephemeral just like the matters they deal with. This rather small and concise form has a creative potential: memes are filled with meaning manifested in multiple conceptual packets integrated in their verbal and visual semiosis. Those packets trigger new frames and scenarios that need to be recognised in order to be interpreted; memes are not self-explanatory and require extra-contextual knowledge, such as the recognition of the convention (e.g., a template meme) as well as intertextual allusions to various cultural, political or social occurrences. The effectiveness of a meme depends on combining verbal and visual elements in such a way that seemingly unrelated scenarios become relatable and viable in a given context. An accurate interpretation relies then on perceiving similarity between those fragmentary instances, which creates incongruity culminating in humorous relief.

The presentation is an attempt to discuss a meme as a concept: in particular, attention will be given to the cognitive mechanisms of selected types of memes, the relation between the verbal and the visual, and how similarity between given domains contributes to the effectiveness of a message. The considerations will be done with reference to the cognitive linguistics framework, in particular dimensions of construal (Langacker 2008, 2019), the theory of conceptual and visual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Forceville 1996, 2002; Kövecses 2002), and conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier & Turner 2002).

Keywords: Internet meme, construal, conceptual blending, metaphor, similarity

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CHANGE YOUR WAY OF THINKING. A NEO-FREGEAN VIEW ON CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING

In this paper, I think about conceptual engineering (CE) from the perspective of an objectivist internalism, which individuates concepts at the level of Fregean Senses (a ‘Neo-Fregean’ view).

In the first part, I suggest characterizing concepts as *ways of thinking* which imply *classifications*. According to this Neo-Fregean view, CE is the activity of *changing or promoting to change ways of thinking*. It is internalist regarding the individuation of concepts (*concept* internalism), whereas it is neutral regarding the truth of internalism or externalism regarding word meanings (*semantic* internalism/externalism). The Neo-Fregean view has some important advantages in theorizing about socio-political CE. I start showing this by comparing it to the opposing views that i) socio-political concepts are individuated externally to epistemic perspectives (concept externalism), ii) CE is targeting word meanings.

In the second part, I position the Neo-Fregean view regarding two theses belonging to Cappelen’s ‘Austerity Framework.’ According to Ci), CE is a process we have little control over, and which is not transparent to us; according to Cii), the process governing particular changes is typically incomprehensible and inscrutable (Cappelen 2018). Cappelen thinks that CE targets word meanings, and he is an externalist about word meanings. I examine what happens to Ci) and Cii) if we adopt the Neo-Fregean view, so that CE targets concepts and we are internalists about concepts. Ci) is now wrong: We have (sufficient) control over CE, even if Cappelen is fully right about word meanings. Cii) is still true: The process governing CE may be incomprehensible and inscrutable. However, to successfully promote changing a way of thinking, we do not need comprehensibility and/or scrutability of this process. This, I argue, may be an advantage of Neo-Fregeanism over subjectivist internalism (Cf. Pollock 2021).

Keywords: conceptual engineering; internalism/externalism; Neo-Fregeanism; ways of thinking; austerity framework; Cappelen, Herman

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IRONIC INTENTION

Existing pragmatic theories (Sperber & Wilson, 1981), (Grice, 1989), (Attardo, 2000), (Utsumi, 2000) explaining irony focus on its essence as an objective feature of an utterance. This approach makes it difficult to discern irony from other indirect speech acts, especially figures of speech. We propose an intentionalist approach, which treats irony as an attitude of the speaker which needs to be recognised by the audience for its successful application.

Per analogy to Gricean communicative intention (Grice, 1957) we define ironic intention, via a set of conditions relating the speaker's and hearer's mental states, the utterance's literal content, and its context. Other authors (Dynel, 2019), (Utsumi, 2000), (Kapogianni, 2016) mention the role of such an intention, without explicitly defining it.

The central tenet of irony is a dissonance which arises from the tension between expectations and reality. It could be pointed out or created by the speaker, and we argue that communicating the intention to indicate this dissonance is a necessary condition for irony to occur.

The main argument for our approach is that ascribing ironic intention to the speaker as a central part of the resolution of intended meaning allows distinguishing it from certain other non-literal uses of language, which existing theories fail to do. Antiphrasis is the most common figure of speech used to convey irony, but virtually any figure could be utilised in an ironic manner. We argue that without the focus on the intention it is impossible to propose a theory explaining irony without misqualifying some figurative speech acts. Accordingly, we use the intentionalist approach to analyse examples of figures of speech used ironically and sincerely, especially ones where existing theories fall short.

Keywords: irony, intention, Grice, pragmatics, figures of speech

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IDENTITY AND INDIVIDUATION IN HYBRID CONCEPTS

According to most theories of concepts, there are two key roles that concepts play: (i) they are the constituents of thoughts, and (ii) they can be shared among different individuals. These roles provide two constraints that concepts are typically expected to satisfy: compositionality and publicity. To satisfy these constraints, it must be possible to establish identity criteria –i.e., when two concepts are the same– as well as individuation criteria –i.e., what allows to distinguish a concept from another. These criteria pose a special problem for theories that regard concepts as structured mental representations. In this talk I address the problem of concept identity and individuation in the context of hybrid views of concepts (Rice 2016; Vicente & Martínez-Manrique 2016). First, I examine the problems that compositionality and publicity pose for theories of structured concepts. In particular, I review some reasons that have recently been offered to discard the publicity constraint (Onofri 2018), and I argue that they rely on a misconception of what publicity demands. Second, I offer a criterion of individuation for hybrid concepts that entails a two-tiered approach to concepts –as a long-term assembly of features, and as short-term instantiations of such an assembly– and I offer a version of originalism for concept individuation (Sainsbury & Tye 2011) to support the continuity between a short-term instantiation and its long-term antecedent. Consequently, questions of identity or “sameness” of concepts can be formulated for each of those tiers. I then argue that judgments of sameness between long-term concepts respond to criteria of similarity, but that this does not pose a problem for the publicity constraint as it is not at this tier where this constraint has to be satisfied. In contrast, short-term concepts can be individuated in a coarser way so as to be shared in a communicative context.

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**REENGINEERING CONCEPTS BY CREATING
A NEW LINGUISTIC SUBCOMMUNITY**

The aim of this paper is to explore a challenge social externalism might pose to politically oriented conceptual engineering, which sees revising our linguistic or conceptual repertoires as “effective tools in the fight against injustice” (Haslanger 2012, 226).

If social externalism is correct, the meaning of terms is determined (at least partly) by the social environment in which it is used. It then seems possible that the meaning of politically significant terms is determined by the oppressive power relations in the linguistic community. This seems to pose a challenge to politically oriented conceptual engineering, however, if it wishes to change the meaning of such terms. For if their problematic meaning is (partially) determined by the oppressive power relations in the linguistic community, how can we revise the former without changing the latter? But if we cannot do so, how could conceptual engineering be an effective tool in the fight against injustice rather than a mere result of it in the case of such terms?

I argue that the key to meeting this challenge is to abandon a monolithic conception of a language and a linguistic community and instead call attention to the existence of linguistic subcommunities within a whole linguistic community, in each of which a different language is used. I suggest how we can reengineer concepts by creating a new linguistic community. Even if the problematic meaning M of a term T of a language L is determined by the underlying oppressive power relations in the whole linguistic community C , one can still create a new local linguistic subcommunity C^* whose members use a new language L^* , in which T has a different meaning M^* . One can then attempt to expand C^* by inviting new members to it and getting them to use L^* rather than L .

Keywords: conceptual engineering; politically significant terms; semantic externalism; social externalism; linguistic communities

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TWO CONCEPTS OF TRUTHMAKING: A PLURALIST SOLUTION TO THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN DEFLATIONARY AND SUBSTANTIVE TRUTHMAKING

In recent years, truthmaking theory has seen research on the issue of whether it is compatible with the deflationary theory of truth. However, apart from this issue, the question can be raised whether deflationary truthmaking can be distinguished from substantive truthmaking within the framework of truthmaking theory alone.

Proponents of substantive truthmaking assume that truthmaking takes place by virtue of the existence of entities called truthmakers. In contrary, proponents of deflationary truthmaking assume that one can talk about making truthbearers true, but at the same time does not commit oneself to adopting entities called truthmakers.

In my talk, I argue that deflationary truthmaking is compatible with substantive truthmaking. To this end, I distinguish between weak deflationary truthmaking, which maintains that semantic ascent mechanisms are sufficient to speak of truth acquisition, and strong deflationary truthmaking, which, although it rejects truthmaking theory, nevertheless treats becoming true ontologically dependent on the world. I show that strong deflationary truthmaking is in fact substantive truthmaking.

I then explain my pluralist approach to truthmaking and show how it differs from Aaron Griffith's approach, by showing that a truthbearer can be made true at once according to the concepts of weak deflationary truthmaking and substantive truthmaking.

Finally, I show, that the compatibility of weak deflationary truthmaking and substance truthmaking can be explained in three ways:

- (1) Weak deflationary truthmaking provides the closest explanation, while substantive truthmaking provides a further explanation (cf. Schnieder)
- (2) Weak deflationary truthmaking indicates what accounts for the truth (cf. McGrath, Kleczka), while substantive truthmaking indicates the ontology underlying a given truth (cf. Asay)
- (3) Weak deflationary truthmaking points out the referent of a truth, while substantive truthmaking specifies its nature

Keywords: Deflationary Truthmaking, Substantive Truthmaking, Truthmaking Pluralism, Semantic Ascent, Explanation, Ontology

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METALINGUISTIC NEGOTIATIONS AND RELATIVE GRADABLE ADJECTIVES

In this paper I argue that metalinguistic negotiations are not as common as Plunkett and Sundell assume. They make two related controversial claims: the claim that speakers do not know what they say and the claim that they directly communicate metalinguistic contents. These two claims generate two challenges that the metalinguistic-negotiation view should meet. Firstly, it should clarify why speakers are oblivious to what they are saying and communicating, and secondly, it should explain the mechanism that transforms what seems like a typical object-language disagreement into a metalinguistic dispute. I argue that the way in which Plunkett and Sundell meet these challenges is unsatisfactory. Regarding their answer to the first challenge, I will argue that the theoretical cost of postulating massive semantic and pragmatic blindness in otherwise competent speakers is too high. Regarding what they say in relation to the second challenge, I will claim that metalinguistic contents can only be conveyed when speakers uttering apparently contradicting claims know that they are using terms with different meanings. In particular, pace Plunkett & Sundell and Mankowitz, I'll demonstrate that in typical conversations metalinguistic contents cannot be conveyed via conversational implicature. I will focus on disagreements involving relative gradable adjectives, like “spicy” and “tall” but my arguments apply to other kinds of expressions as well.

Additionally, I revise the three criteria for recognizing metalinguistic negotiations recently offered by Andres Soria-Ruiz (2021). I argue that his second criterion is irrelevant for identifying metalinguistic negotiations, but the other two are appropriate and in fact can be used to demonstrate that typical disagreements involving relative gradable adjectives are *not* metalinguistic negotiations.

If my arguments are correct, then metalinguistic negotiations are certainly not ubiquitous.

Keywords: conversational implicature, metalinguistic negotiation, speaker error

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MEANING AS A VARIABLE AND ITS “ENGINEERABILITY”

One of the most prominent theories on meaning is semantic externalism which holds that a direct, external relation determines a given term’s reference – independently of whether we know or will ever know this relationship. A celebrated version of this semantic view is *physical externalism*, which endorses that meaning is a variable, the value of which is determined *solely* by the nature of the physical environment (Liu 2002). Saul Kripke (1980) and Hilary Putnam (1975), the leading exponents of physical externalism, show this with several famous examples and thought experiments that aim to make evident that, e.g., ‘water’ refers to all substances that have the same *nature* (physical structure) as what we have paradigmatically called so. My aim in this talk is to show that if we see that meaning is a variable but whose value is not only externally fixed and determined by the referent’s physical nature and properties, but we also gain some advantages. This value is *modulable* according to various factors (both pragmatic and empirical – such as nature, authority, ethics, social, political, legal, etc.), whose weight can be evaluated case by case depending on the context, experts, etc. To see this modulability of meaning is crucial for its further pragmatic, social import, for within this view, meaning can be “engineered”: it can be revised or replaced based on pragmatic concerns (Plunkett 2013, 2015; Capellen et al. 2020; Thomasson 2020). For instance, on this alternative view, we could see that a word like ‘parent’ cannot serve a good purpose (for several pragmatic and ethical reasons) if it refers – as physical externalism would hold – simply to the immediate biological progenitor. Rather, ‘parent’ would serve a better function if its reference is not limited to that but also covers other socially constructed features associated with that concept (Haslanger 2009, 2012).

Keywords: physical externalism, semantic disputes, conceptual engineering, meaning revision, variable

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PERCEPTION VERBS AS NESTED RELATIONS

In my presentation, I will introduce a new method for formally representing perception verbs and their philosophical implications. I will argue that theta-roles, the roles that arguments of a verb play, can be represented as attributes or marks on the arguments of a verb, similar to how it is done in a relational model of data.

By having a set of attributes, it is possible to define the relation scheme for each predicate symbol, which is a formal representation of the verb's theta-grid and expresses truth-conditionally relevant information about how elements participate in the relation named by the verb. With regards to perception verbs, I will argue that they are represented as two-place predicates with a relation scheme “the agent of perception, the object of perception.” They differ from other relations in that their second attribute, “the object of perception,” may contain not only values from an atomic domain (individuals, such as Bart in “Antony saw Brutus”), but may also contain values that are (nested) relations themselves, with unbounded depth (“Antony saw Brutus kill Caesar”, “Erastus saw Antony see Brutus kill Caesar” etc.). I will argue that the presented semantics of perception verbs is compositional, extensional, veridical and allows for obeying all entailment patterns for NI perception sentences. In the final part of my talk, I will address the question of what it means philosophically that the semantics is eventless. I will take part in the so-called “constructive ontological reduction” and provide an analysis of the quantification over events as nonbasic entities, as well as clarify a claim about their identity conditions.

Keywords: perception verbs, NI sentences, relational model of data, cell reference, nested relations

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KRIPKENSTEIN'S SCEPTICAL SOLUTION AS A REVISION OF THE FOLK NOTION OF MEANING

The aim is to argue that the vision of meaning in the “sceptical solution” proposed by Kripke in his interpretation of Wittgenstein should be understood as a revision of the folk concept of meaning and to present the relevance of this position to the contemporary metaphysics of meaning.

The main idea of a sceptical solution is that it is impossible to provide a direct answer to a sceptical problem about meaning. On the minimalist interpretation of a sceptical solution, Kripkenstein proposes a version of a deflationary account of meaning facts: meaning facts exist, albeit only in a minimal sense. Rejection of meaning facts is seen as denial of substantial meaning facts.

The minimalist reading of the sceptical solution has important theoretical and exegetical advantages, yet it assumes, wrongly, in my view, that minimalist account of semantic facts aligns with the folk view on meaning. I will argue that these two notions are in conflict. The deflationary notion of meaning denies that meaning can play an explanatory role, while the folk assume that we can explain phenomena, such as action based on understanding, by appealing to the notion of meaning.

This conflict with the folk is not a reason to reject minimalist sceptical solution. Rather, it should be seen justified revision of the folk concept. Kripkenstein identifies an important deficiency in the folk concept of meaning (that the folk) notion of meaning is both explanatory and normative, and proposes a revisionary preservationist approach to meaning.

I believe this tension is real and that when we attempt to provide a metaphysical account of meaning, we must choose between eliminativism and conceptual revision. Many existing accounts of meaning (e.g., naturalist ones) can be interpreted as being covertly revisionary.

Keywords: conceptual revision, meaning scepticism, normativity of meaning, semantic deflationism, Kripkenstein

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CORPUS DATA SUGGESTS CONSPIRACY THEORIES ARE NOT THEORIES

String theory, *music theory*, and *critical race theory* certainly differ in terms of their scientific, epistemic, and socio-cultural standing. However, being all theories, they also share important properties: They are (a) investigated scientifically, (b) learned and taught, and (c) applied to phenomena. In recent years, philosophers have debated whether conspiracy theories are indeed theories or merely (systems of) beliefs (Dentith, 2022, Deutz, 2022, Napolitano, 2022, see also Pigden, 2007). In this talk, we present a corpus-linguistic study that aims to (a) identify markers of scientific theories that will allow us to delineate “real” theories from theories in name only, and (b) present evidence that conspiracy theories are not theories.

We collected roughly 15.000 comments from the social media website Reddit, featuring phrases of the form “VERB [theory]”, e.g., “studying game theory”, “using music theory”, and analysed the relation between six control theories – *critical race theory*, *fan theories*, *game theory*, *music theory*, *string theory*, and *theories* (simpliciter) – and our target class *conspiracy theory*. We then examined and classified all those verbs standing before these theories. Many of these verbs fall into the following categories:

- (a) Scientific verbs: create, develop, prove, confirm, define, elaborate, etc.
- (b) Educational verbs: teach, learn, explain, study, describe, visualize, etc.
- (c) Applications verbs: use, apply, practice, etc.

While all six control theories frequently featured verbs from at least two of these categories, verbs standing in front of “conspiracy theory” were dominated by a fourth category, which we call “spreading words.” Instead of being elaborated, taught, studied, and applied, ordinary language users predominantly say that conspiracy theories are spread, pushed, and promoted.

We conclude that our corpus-analytic study provides a new linguistic approach to identify real theories. Importantly, conspiracy theories do not seem to satisfy the requirements for being theories.

Keywords: corpus analysis; conspiracy theories; theories; verb classification; linguistics

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PROPOSITIONS AND NON-DOXASTIC ATTITUDE REPORTS

The aim of the talk is to present a new concept of a ‘proposition’ based on analysis of *non-doxastic* attitude reports. In the analytic philosophy, a proposition is roughly identified with the content of a declarative sentence: something that can intuitively be true or false. For instance, (1):

(1) The dictator has been assassinated,

expresses the proposition that the (relevant) dictator has been assassinated. Propositions play a significant role in the theory of attitude reports (e.g., ‘S believes that p’). Many philosophical considerations focus on doxastic attitude ascriptions (like beliefs or knowledge) and the problem of substitutions failures (e.g., Frege 1892, Cresswell 1989, Heck 2012). In my presentation, I want to discuss some novel data regarding the non-doxastic attitudes (e.g., ‘want’, ‘fear’, ‘wonder’, etc). Roughly, the problem is that while (1) seems to express the same proposition as (1*): ‘the dictator is dead and has been assassinated’, the two clauses yield non-equivalent readings when embedded in non-doxastic attitude ascriptions:

(2) a. Anne wonders whether the dictator has been assassinated.

b. Anne wonders whether the dictator is dead and has been assassinated.

The second report, (2b), indicates a more complex attitude and can be intuitively false when the first, (2a), is true. (For discussion see Blumberg 2017, Rostworowski 2018). In order to account for the data, I propose to construe propositions as discourse update functions. This is a different account from two competitive approaches to propositions in philosophical and linguistic literature: the one equating propositions with sets of possible worlds (Hintikka 1969) and the other representing them as structured entities (e.g., King 1995). I agree with the second approach in that the information structure of a statement affects its propositional content. However, according to my proposal, the information structure of a statement can be captured in terms of its potential contribution to a discourse and various pragmatic constraints making this contribution proper. In particular, a piece of information is proper in discourse if it does not repeat the information already provided. In that respect, (1) and (1*) are different since (1*) is improper in a discourse which has already established that the dictator is dead. Formally, I represent propositions as functions from contexts, i.e., sets of possible worlds, to contexts (cf. Heim 1992) and show how this analysis can be applied in the semantic theory of (non-doxastic) attitude reports.

Keywords: attitude reports, informational structure, non-doxastic attitudes, propositions

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HOW TO INDIVIDUATE PROPER NAMES?

The recent popularity of theories of proper names that appeal to the metalinguistic property of *being called N* naturally gave rise to the question of how exactly such a property should be analysed. In the meantime, it has been noted by Gray (2015) that a complete analysis has to account for a troubling phenomenon unaccounted for by the first attempts that tried to individuate proper names as pairs of orthographic and phonological strings.

The difficulty stems from the fact that the spoken utterance of the following sentence could be used to correctly describe a situation in which two people whose names are pronounced the same but spelled differently (e.g., “Jean” and “Gene”), will be late:

(1) Two /dʒi:n/s will be late.

This suggests that both Jean and Gene satisfy what seems to be a name-predicate, contrary to what the standard approach to name individuation predicts.

The problem seems even more pressing as it was recently argued by Stojnić (forthcoming) that it occurs not only for Predicativism, and possibly other views explicitly appealing to the metalinguistic property but rather for the views from all across the spectrum, Millianism included.

In my presentation, after introducing the problem more systematically, I want to offer some thoughts on how we should think about approaching it and whether the ambiguity solution, rejected by Stojnić, is as scary as it looks.

Keywords: names; predicativism; Millianism; individuation; metalinguistic constraint

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**REFERENCE THE UNTOUCHABLE. ON THE LIMITS OF REVISING CONCEPTS
USING THE METHOD OF CASES**

Recently it has been argued that the method of cases can be interpreted as aimed at concept revision, and thereby it can be seen as a part of conceptual engineering (Andow 2020; Sękowski 2022). In the talk I will show that although the method of cases in most philosophical theories could be interpreted as being intended to revise their target concepts, within a theory of reference this method cannot be used to revise the concept of reference. The reason for this is that the possibility of adopting the conceptual engineering-friendly interpretation of the method of cases depends on the role that intuitions play in a given theory in which this method is used. I will show that intuitions of extension in a theory of reference constitute a set of data that needs to be explained, while in most other philosophical theories they could either be abandoned in favour of intuitions of intension or serve as a criterion for the adequacy of the proposed definition of the target concept. This feature of a theory of reference is caused by the fact that an implicit understanding of what reference is in this theory is usually assumed. In effect, the claim in paradigmatic instances of the method of cases within a theory of reference does not concern whether an expression does or does not refer in particular cases, but rather what the reference of a certain expression is. Therefore, the method of cases cannot be justified by intuitions of intension and thereby it cannot be used in order to revise the concept of reference.

Keywords: method of cases, theory of reference, conceptual engineering, intuitions, concept revision

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(RE)CONCEPTUALIZING LANGUAGE: FROM ARTIFACTUAL TO NATURAL KIND

In this paper I provide an overview of definitions and approaches to natural kinds and propose to consider language as a possible natural kind. I also intend to show the development of the concept of language in generative grammar, from early formalizations to most recent views within the biolinguistics paradigm.

Classic semantic investigations into natural kinds concentrated predominantly upon such terms as “gold, lemon, tiger, acid” (Putnam 1970/1975: 139), later discussions, especially outside semantics, focused on differences (but also similarities) between various ‘kinds-of-kinds’, i.e. ‘natural kinds’, ‘real kinds’, ‘social kinds’, ‘interactive kinds’, ‘conventional kinds’, ‘artifactual kinds’, etc. (for useful overviews, see Thomasson 2007, Olivero & Carrara 2021). Putnam himself has hinted at possibilities of discussing natural kinds outside the established ‘core’, he has even “asserted that for an anthropologist, and hence from the point of view of anthropology, the term ‘culture’ is a natural kind term” (Putnam in Fernández Moreno 2016: 18), which essentially follows from the fact that “in all disciplines in which there are laws there are natural kinds” and hence “there is a huge *variety* of terms that can be considered as natural kind terms” (Fernández Moreno 2016: 18).

Such an extended approach to natural kinds enables focusing on domain-specific kinds and postulating natural kinds existing only within the boundaries of a given discipline. Some more recent studies within social sciences discuss the status of such possible natural kinds as ‘emotions’ (Charland 2002), ‘innateness’ (Khalidi 2016), ‘knowledge’ (Kumar 2014), ‘moral judgment’ (Kumar 2015), or ‘speech acts’ (Ball 2014), to name just a few.

Within this extended approach, I investigate Chomskyan mentalism (cf. Chomsky 1980, 2007, 2016), and claim that within the generative paradigm language is a natural kind.

Keywords: language, artifactual kind, natural kind, generative grammar

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TOPIC CONTINUITY IN CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING AND MEANING HOLISM

Topic continuity in conceptual engineering is mainly a problem for a representational understanding of concepts (Löhr 2021). The talk introduces meaning holism to conceptual engineering as a non-representational approach to contribute to the discussion about topic continuity.

Representational semantics as the prevailing framework in conceptual engineering (e.g., Cappelen 2018, Löhr 2021) presuppose stable relations between represented and representation. To change this relation results in semantic changes threatening the continuity of topics in communication and research and, thus, questioning the success of conceptual engineering (compare Jackmann 2020).

Representationalist strategies, therefore, include additional stable notions like “topics” (Cappelen 2018) or a dichotomic picture like Sawyer’s (2020) distinction between a changeable linguistic practice and fix relations to non-linguistic properties. Belleri (2021), on the other hand, suggests downplaying the problem by accepting semantic change and introducing two different approaches of inquiry.

Alternatively, meaning holism is a non-representational approach that conceptual engineers are rarely discussing or expecting to complicate things (Cappelen 2018) but might actually benefit from.

The talk first argues that downplaying the “change of subject objection” (Belleri 2021) is rather successful within meaning holism that already implies different notions of semantic instability: Meaning shift follows from interrelations between concepts (compare Quine 1951, Brandom 1994, Esfeld 2002, Dresner 2012); meaning perspectivism follows from the holistic confinement of the concepts (compare Fodor and Lepore 1992, Esfeld 2002).

Additionally, conceptual engineering benefits from tools meaning holism developed to avoid unwanted consequences. As an example, scorekeeping (Brandom 1994) is presented to control and make explicit meaning change that remains otherwise opaque and inscrutable. The scorekeeping instruments *de-re* and *de-dicto* ascriptions provide topic continuity as a kind of quality control that can be referred to in the case of a communication breakdown or within inquiry.

Keywords: conceptual engineering; topic continuity; meaning holism; representations; scorekeeping

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CONTRADICTIONARY UTTERANCES AND CONCEPTUAL TAXONOMY

Concepts from the same semantic field may be arranged in a hierarchical taxonomy. One possible arrangement is that between hypernym being on a superordinate level and hyponym being on a subordinate level. This paper's subject of study concerns utterances expressing contradictions involving concepts being in such categorical hierarchy, e.g., "this is not a car, it is a Hyundai." On the semantic level, due to the encyclopaedic meaning of the lexical items, this utterance contains a contradiction. The hyponym ("Hyundai") includes the hypernym ("car"), therefore excluding the hyponym from the generalized level of categorization leads to a contradiction.

However, language users encountering such utterances are not stricken by them and do not take them as trivial falsehood. Assuming the cooperative attitude of the interlocutors, in accordance with the principles of pragmatics, hearers somehow understand the intention behind the utterances. It seems that the pragmatic inference of the meaning of such utterances involves an interpretation formulated as "y is not a typical x", where y stands for the hyponym and x for the hypernym. The key, however, lies in how the typicality of the hypernym is construed as a concept. Here, we refer to the prototype theory in order to a) explain how such utterances exploiting given lexical items may be successfully interpreted as non-contradictory, and b) show that interpreting such utterances forces to appeal to properties of the given hyponym as salient and not included in the prototypical conceptualization of the hypernym.

Keywords: Concepts, Contradiction, Hyponym, Hypernym, Prototype Theory, Pragmatic Inference

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MOOREAN LIES

Can one successfully *lie* that *it is raining and that they do not believe it*? It certainly seems odd to think so; such an assertion and its counterparts, called Moorean statements (after Moore 1942), are easily recognized by ordinary speakers as infelicitous or even self-contradictory. It would then seem that even intending to lie with a Moorean sentence is irrational, almost as if one intended to lie by uttering a flat-out contradiction. But there is nothing absurd in believing that some other person fails to believe something true; why then the speaker cannot deceive us that they *themselves* are such a person?

In my talk I will elaborate more on the nature of this puzzle and how it might be resolved by various definitions of lying and approaches towards an explanation of the abovementioned Moore's Paradox. I will begin by clarifying the relationship between Moorean assertions and a traditional definition of a lie as a believed-false statement uttered with an intention to deceive the addressee (Mahon 2016). I will then argue, in line with Chisholm and Feehan (1977) that the definition of lying needs to include the strengthening of the deception condition – that one intends the addressee to believe that the speaker believes the lie – and that the fact that *irrationality of the Moorean belief* is a common knowledge among speakers needs to be accepted in order to make sense of why Moorean lies are impossible.

In the end I will consider whether Moorean assertions may play the role of “bald-face lies” (Sorensen 2007). I will argue that Moorean lies importantly differ from standard examples of bald-face lies in that they are *necessarily* commonly known to be regarded as false by the speaker and argue that this fact has important consequences for non-deceptionist (Sorensen 2007, Carson 2006) views on lying.

Keywords: lying, Moore's Paradox, assertion, belief, deception.

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STRAWSON ON METASEMANTICS: A LOGIC FOR ORDINARY LANGUAGE?

Is there a logic of ordinary language? Strawson seems to be infamously remembered as having answered this question—along with his fellow Ordinary Language philosophers and the followers of the later Wittgenstein—in the resoundingly negative. In this paper, I tackle the decades long accusation that Strawson did not believe in the possibility of a formal semantics for natural language. Though there are ideological and textual grounds to attribute such scepticism to Strawson, a closer reading of his oeuvre would show that this supposed animosity towards formalism in semantics was no more than a cautionary attitude towards the dangers of oversimplification, conceptual revision, and the misguided primacy of formal logic over natural language.

Strawson was indeed wary of the philosophical approach to language carried both by positivists (Carnap) and post-positivists (Quine and Davidson), for their inherent revisionism and reductionism clashes violently with his distinctive descriptive and anti-reductionist strategies. Nonetheless, in honouring his compatibilist spirit and his systematic inclination, Strawson would not deny the utility of certain forms of regimentation and model-building when it comes to the representation and understanding of our linguistic practices, as long as such an enterprise be conceived against the larger and complex backdrop of a theory of human communication that makes room for our common-sensical conceptions of the subject and pays respect to the indispensable notions of intention, reference, truth, intensionality and normativity. Thus, contrary to popular belief, Strawson actually had hopes for a logic of ordinary language, just not the narrow and exact logic favoured by his neo-positivist rivals. Under this more positive light, Strawson's insightful ideas about the nature of language and its study can be brought back to the forum of philosophical semantics and the philosophy of linguistics.

Keywords: Strawson, Philosophy of Language, Metasemantics, Semantics, Logic, Natural Language, Philosophy of Linguistics

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CONCEPTUALLY ENGINEERING DISAGREEMENT

We disagree quite often, in many ways and about many things. For example, we disagree about the age of the Earth, about how to raise our children, or about which books are good. We also disagree by making contrary assertions, by noting how our preferences differ, or by simply shaking our heads. Given this multifaceted character of disagreement, what exactly is it to disagree? Does it even make sense to search for a unique notion or should we simply adopt pluralism?

In this paper, I argue that a unitary notion of disagreement is both useful and attainable. First, I lay down the reasons for having such a notion – some internal to various debates in semantics, others independent of them. Then I propose a notion of “minimal disagreement”, forged by abstracting away from (most of) the proposals in the recent literature on perspectival expressions. Crucial for my proposal are three notions: the type of attitudes involved (A), the type of content the disagreement is about (B) and the level at which the disagreement takes place (C). Here is my definition:

- (MD) Two people minimally disagree iff there is an A, a B and a C such that
- a) they have conflicting attitudes of type A towards
 - b) the same content of type B, at
 - c) level of discourse C.

In the remainder of the paper, I compare this notion with other recent proposals, both monist and pluralist. Thus, I argue that previous notions are either incomplete, that they are too-domain dependent, or that they are too costly. Finally, I focus on the issue of disagreement presupposing a common content (as (MD) states) and consider several examples that might suggest that no such common content exists. My reply to them is that, contrary to appearances, there is a common content disagreement is about, but the level at which that content appears is obscured.

Keywords: disagreement, monism vs. pluralism, perspectival expressions, common content

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PRESUPPOSITIONS, HOLES, AND PLUGS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

Presuppositions are traditionally considered to be necessary conditions for the truth-evaluability of sentences (or utterances, in the case of the so-called pragmatic presuppositions). For example, if a speaker S says: ‘All of Ann’s children are blonde’, S presupposes that Ann has children. Lauri Karttunen famously argued that in compound sentences some expressions can block presuppositions of complement sentences (he dubbed them “plugs”) and some do not block them (he named them “holes”). For example, if S says, “Adam believes that John is blonde,” S does not presuppose that John is blonde (because “believes” is a plug), but if S says, “Adam learned that John is blonde,” S does presuppose that John is blonde (since “learned” is a hole). Some tentative empirical data (Carrell, Richter, 2009) suggested that the distinction between plugs and holes introduced by Karttunen is not reflected in folk linguistic intuitions. However, this study investigated only one example of a plug and one example of a hole (moreover, the analysis was based on a rather small-sized sample of respondents). We conducted a study that investigated twenty compound sentences containing different expressions from the Karttunen’s list: ten holes and ten plugs. We found that, on average, there is a systematic difference in folk linguistic intuitions elicited by these two types of expressions – laypersons are in fact more likely to accept that plugs block presuppositions and that holes do not block them. However, our results also indicate that not all linguistic items listed by Karttunen behave as he predicted; in particular, some of the expressions he classified as plugs often elicit intuitions which fit the predictions for holes.

Keywords: presuppositions, plugs, holes, presupposition triggers

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POLYSEMY, HOMONYMY, RECLAMATION

Reclamation of a slur involves a creation of a new, positively-valenced meaning that gradually replaces the old pejorative meaning. This means that at a critical stage, the slur is ambiguous. It has been claimed that this ambiguity is polysemy (Jeshion, 2020; Jusińska, 2021; Zeman, 2022). However, this view fails to explain why the introduction of the new meaning forces the old one out of existence. I argue that this datapoint can be explained by invoking the mechanism of homonymic conflict (Gilliéron & Edmont, 1902; Gilliéron & Roques, 1912; Williams, 1944), and, therefore, that the ambiguity involved in reclamation is homonymy. My account meshes well with the claim, made by a number of black linguists, that the rhotic (“-er”) and non-rhotic (“-a”) variants of the N-word are actually two different words (McWhorter, 2021, pp. 193–199; Rahman, 2012, p. 138; Smitherman, 2006, p. 54). Furthermore, I show that my account provides a neat way of conceptualizing the difference between two types of conceptual engineering, namely reclamation and amelioration. Reclamation aims at communicative disruption and features the introduction of a homonym. Amelioration, in turn, tries to preserve communicative continuity and features the introduction of a polyseme. I conclude by suggesting that we need to rethink the standard ways of drawing the distinction between polysemy and homonymy.

Key words: polysemy, homonymy, slurs, reclamation, conceptual engineering

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**Philosophy of
Argumentation
Workshop
(PhilArg 2023)**

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**ALIENS IN THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS. AN ARGUMENTATIVE AND
METAPHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT**

Usually, a thought experiment meets the argumentative need to make the reader imagine a situation that is incredibly difficult to (re)produce in material reality, or even one that is completely impossible – yet thinkable.

The peculiarity of this strategy is the paradox whereby one wants to prove a philosophical (or scientific) point appealing to situations that do not actually exist or, if they did, would be extremely bizarre. Hence, T. Es can be object of meta-philosophy: why, and how exactly, one should argue through T. Es?

The *topos* we'll address, that of the extraterrestrial, is relevant in this respect, since it has been evoked in the recent history of philosophy and science to prove points relating to stories that are, however, entirely human.

We will analyse the logical structure of arguments with aliens in a selection of T. Es, focusing on their role and argumentative strength. A distinction will emerge between constructive cases (aliens are used in support of a given thesis) and counter-proof ones (they are used to refute one). Elements of similarity and difference between the two argumentative strategies will be highlighted. In this, we will focus on the form of counterfactual reasoning, i.e., the central logical structure of every T.E. Then, a hypothesis will be advanced on the greater or lesser logical validity of the alien, and on its argumentative strength, in both cases.

Finally, we will address the epistemological and anthropological features of the alien. We will argue that it brings a really peculiar kind of diversity, as an argumentative character. Why choose an extraterrestrial while there is already some much diversity on Earth, after all? Answer: the alien transcends earthy diversity and, therefore, is argumentatively plastic. But isn't this a double-edged sword with respect to persuasive power as it lessens the verisimilitude of the argument? We will assess strengths and risks of employing aliens as characters in T.Es.

Keywords: Thought experiments; Counterfactuals; Theory of argumentation; Refutation; Diversity

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**SYSTEMIC MEANS OF PERSUASION.
RESULTS OF A PRELIMINARY CORPUS STUDY**

The aim of the talk will be to present the results of a preliminary corpus study intended to identify systemic means of persuasion in two corpora of texts: a corpus of press articles and parliamentary speeches from 2019-2022 (Korpus Rzeczpospolitej; Ogrodniczuk 2018). The presentation will consist of four parts. In the first one, selected argumentative textual phenomena will be characterised, in particular the role of reasoning indicators (Segura-Tinoco A., Cantador I. 2021) and meta-operators belonging to systemic means of persuasion (Awdiejew 2004, 2007; Sinnott-Armstrong, Fogelin 2015). One of the main functions of the latter is to stop the infinite regress of justification and to avoid the need to present further arguments. The second section will describe the human-annotated corpus in terms of the distinguished phenomena. The third part will discuss machine learning techniques based on transformers, i.e., state-of-the-art neural network architectures, which allow automatic classification of tokens (Devlin et al. 2018), and the results of their training on the prepared corpus. Part four will contain conclusions of two kinds. Firstly, conclusions concerning systemic means of persuasion and their role in argument perception and evaluation. Secondly, conclusions of a methodological nature concerning the possibility and effectiveness of creating annotated corpora by applying the techniques of transfer learning.

Keywords: systemic means of persuasion, argumentation, argument mining, corpus study, computational linguistics, deep learning, transfer learning

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EMOTION-BASED PROFILES OF POLITICAL LEADERS ON TWITTER

In his paper, Macagno (2022) shows argumentation profiles of three populist leaders (Bolsonaro, Salvini, Trump) compared against Biden. The rhetorical styles of politicians were empirically derived from their Twitter posts and manually analysed according to the use of argumentation schemes, fallacies, and emotive words. In this paper, we further extend this approach: we investigate emotions expressed by politicians; we apply automatic techniques of detecting emotions; we employ *Argument Analytics* technology (Lawrence et al. 2016) to identify patterns and trends of emotions expressed in the large-scale data. In order to enrich Macagno's analysis, we first develop emotion-based profiles, i.e., we add on a fourth dimension of the analysis: emotions expressed by politicians in their tweets, building upon well-established categorisation of emotions by Ekman (1992). Next, we apply automatic Natural Language Processing techniques in order to scale up the analysis: we compare over 60k tweets of twenty politicians in the US, the UK, Canada and New Zealand a year before and a year after elections. We then analyse data in *Argument Analytics* technology in order to make sense of communication behaviour of these politicians and to create their emotion-based profiles.

We observe, for example, that Biden becomes more emotionally neutral after elections: 77% tweets contained emotions before the election compared to 64% after the election. In terms of types of emotions that Biden expressed, the main change was in joy and anger: he shifted in expressing joy from 40% tweets to 49%; and anger from 21% tweets to 7%. On the other hand, Trump did not change his emotion-based rhetorical style after elections. In particular, 80% of his tweets contained emotions regardless of whether he tweeted before or after elections, and their distribution maintained at the same level of 45% tweets expressing joy and 32% expressing anger.

Keywords: Emotions expressed in language; Argument Analytics; Argumentation profiles; Emotion-based profiles; Rhetorical style of politicians

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ON CONVINCING AND PERSUADING

The distinction between convincing and persuading has been puzzling for different disciplines (e.g., philosophy, rhetorical studies, psychology) and has been tackled for a long time. However, it is still pressing and unsettled for us at the present time. The interpreters who dealt with this theoretical distinction have joined one of two main groups:

- a) On the one hand, some argue in favour of a genuine distinction between convincing and persuading, which typically hinges on the consequences of these two linguistic phenomena respectively in terms of influence on mental states and influence on actions, which derives in turn from the distinction between communicative ends and communicative means.
- b) On the other hand, some interpreters both deny the existence of a relevant distinction and conflate convincing and persuasion, while others admit that convincing and persuasion are conceptually different phenomena, although they consider said difference as irrelevant or rather excessively nuanced.

In our article, we want to show, against interpreters in the group b), that it is possible to effectively establish a conceptually clear difference between the two, and, against interpreters in the group a), that this difference can be established without any reference to the distinction between influencing mental states rather than actions.

Our proposal draws on van Eemeren and Grootendorst's pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation to define both convincing and persuasion, and is inspired by Searle's remarks on sincere and insincere promising. We demonstrate that they can be identified as perlocutionary acts associated with three different complex illocutionary acts, namely the acts of arguing (in general), sincere arguing, and insincere arguing, and provide precise felicity conditions for each. This allows us to prove that sincere and insincere arguing are subcases of arguing (in general), and to derive another important result, namely that convincing is a subcase of persuasion. In the final part of the paper, we discuss the pros and cons of our proposal.

Keywords: convincing; persuading; pragma-dialectic; speech act theory; arguing; complex illocutionary act.

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AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON THE EVALUATION OF METAPHORICAL *AD HOMINEM* ARGUMENTS

Metaphors can give arguments more impact and intensity, but they can also convey emotional bias and value judgments (Semino 2008; Burgers 2016). Metaphors are indeed “more emotionally engaging than literal expressions” (Citron & Goldberg 2014: 9) and might affect the evaluation of arguments because of their covert framing effects (Thibodeau & Borodisky 2011, 2013).

In particular, the paper considers metaphors when they appear in the fallacy *ad hominem*, “which involves an attack against the person delivering the argument rather than the position argued” (Tindale 2007: 12). Indeed, *ad hominem* arguments are part of a debate, where the emotional involvement of individuals is a prominent feature (but see van Eemeren, Garssen & Meuffels 2012).

The paper aims to understand whether metaphors in the *ad hominem* argument premise can lead to commit the fallacy *ad hominem*, i.e., to evaluate a fallacious argument as sound. The research hypothesis is that negatively-valenced conventional metaphors lead participants to evaluate the *ad hominem* fallacy as sound because they are persuasive: conventional metaphors go unnoticed and negative stimulus have in general a stronger emotional impact than positive stimulus.

Thirty participants were presented with 8 fallacies *ad hominem* with novel (4 positively-valenced, 4 negatively-valenced) metaphors, 8 fallacies *ad hominem* with conventional (4 positively-valenced, 4 negatively-valenced) metaphors, and 8 fallacies *ad hominem* with (4 positively-valenced, 4 negatively-valenced) literal counterparts.

Participants were asked to evaluate whether 1) the conclusion of the arguments followed from the premise, 2) the arguments were understandable, ambiguous, convincing, emotionally engaging, 3) they found a logical connection between premise and conclusion, and 4) they believed in the conclusion (independent from the premise). Preliminary results showed that participants fall into the fallacy in the case of conventional metaphors, when compared to novel metaphors and literal terms, and in the case of negatively-valenced metaphors compared to positively-valenced metaphors.

Keywords: metaphors, fallacy *ad hominem*, argument evaluation, emotional impact, persuasiveness.

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COMPUTER-ASSISTED ENHANCEMENT OF ARGUMENT EVALUATION SKILLS

In the last 10-15 years, there has been a huge increase in awareness of the crucial role of argument evaluation skills in the contemporary (mis)information ecosystem. At the same time, mass-teaching argument evaluation procedures developed by specialists would not be feasible. However, many elements of solid argumentation theories, evaluation procedures and critical thinking courses can be implemented in UI/UX features which would lead and support non-specialists in evaluating arguments and generating high-quality arguments (thus, self-evaluating).

In my presentation, I will demonstrate four cases illustrated with examples from argument-mapping software.

UI/UX feature	Value	Literature
Premise/conclusion text boxes are color-coded separately from arrows representing logical relations.	The solutions make clear the distinction between theses content evaluation and the whole argument lever evaluation.	Differentiation between strength and cogency in Vaughn 2018. Three attack targets in Yu & Zenker 2020.
Users can support and attack conclusions/premises or logical relations separately.		
The basic argument structure is presented to users as “One should think that X because Y” and not simply “X because Y” or “p is X because p is Y” and so on.	The structure is not meant for adding the commitment meta-layer. Rather, it prevents confusion between explaining and giving arguments.	Argument and explanation as distinct forms of reasoning in Mayes 2010. In contrast with Wagemans 2016.
A simple algorithm warns users when their proposed premises might not be singular, specific, indicative, concise or consistent.	Users can avoid contributing non-arguments as well as underdeveloped or multiple-in-one theses which mix data with warrants or backings (maxims or endoxa etc.).	Argument scheme theories, e.g., Toulmin 1958, Rigotti & Greco 2019. Strategies for standardizing arguments in Govier 2010.

Keywords: argument evaluation, argument mapping, computer-assisted argumentation, UX/UI for better argumentation, argument structure, explanation vs argument, general public argumentation skills.

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ON THE LIMITS OF AI-GENERATED EXPLANATIONS

Artificial intelligence (AI) becomes one of our main sources of information. From the search engines, like Google, to chatbots, like the new ChatGPT, which has been used to write essays, code, give advice, or solve maths problems. But can it be a source of knowledge or understanding?

The idea that not only information but knowledge can be transferred from the speaker to the audience is generally considered to be uncontroversial. Such a transfer happens via testimony. It has been argued that AI can testify, and thus that it can be our source of knowledge (e.g., Freiman and Miller 2020).

We investigate whether, and in what sense, AI can be a source of understanding. It has been broadly assumed that understanding is generated by explanations (e.g., Lipton 2004; cf. Turri 2015). It is, however, debated whether it can be transferred from the speaker to the audience. The orthodox view maintains that understanding cannot be *directly* transmitted (e.g., Zagzebski 2008), i.e., the speaker can only provide pieces of information that *contribute to* (but do not guarantee) the audience's acquisition of understanding. Those who resist the orthodox view argue that at least some kinds of understanding can be directly transmitted to the audience (e.g., Boyd 2017), i.e., by explaining p , the speaker can put the audience in a position to understand p .

While we agree that in human interactions such direct transmission of understanding is possible, we argue that it is different for AI. AI can be only an *indirect* source of understanding, i.e., it can provide necessary pieces of information, but cannot guide us through the process of grasping the relations between them and thus guarantee that we will understand whatever is being explained. This is because the crucial part of a successful explanation is understanding the phenomenon by the explainer themselves, which allows for tracking the progress of understanding in the audience. As we demonstrate by appeal to a series of cases, at least currently, AI does not fulfil this requirement.

Keywords: Artificial intelligence; understanding; explanation; testimony; speech acts

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**PRINCIPLES, RULES, AND STANDARDS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ARGUMENTATION.
A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT SCOTUS AND POLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL
TRIBUNAL JUSTIFICATION PRACTICES**

Persuasive argumentation is of great importance in justifying decisions regarding morally sensitive issues. In such cases, judges are expected to find solutions to fundamental conflicts of incommensurable constitutional principles, which are inherently open-ended, general and in need of interpretation. The pragmatic turn in both normative and descriptive judicial practice began to gain in prominence around 1985-1990 in the USA (Olsen 2017) and it argues that “legal controversies arise in specific and often unique contexts and that such controversies are better addressed with reference to these contexts than by abstract legal principles (Olsen 2017: 206). In the context of adjudicating hard cases, this means that US judges are capable of agreeing on the (un)constitutionality of a given practice even when the theories, concepts or values that underpin their judgments may radically differ. In the actual judicial decision-making, judges could agree not only on the outcome, but also on its rationale by offering low-level or mid-level principles (Sunstein 2007). In contrast, constitutional judicial decision-making in Poland has remained under the sway of the classic legal formalism and morally sensitive issues are addressed through broad and abstract reasoning which relies on general principles and values (cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969). This paper aims to illustrate and reflect upon two fundamentally different strategies of resolving constitutional conflicts in hard cases addressing morally sensitive issues (Dworkin 1986). Two cases are compared in which judges resolve a conflict between freedom to exercise religion and the animal welfare. In *Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah*, the US Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of animal sacrifice for religious purposes. In Poland, the Constitutional Tribunal in its decision (K52/13) ruled for the admissibility of ritual slaughter. Adopting the theoretical perspective of Legal Argumentation Theory (Feteris 2017; Dahlman and Feteris 2013) this paper argues that it is the former approach, based on the concept of incompletely theorized agreement (Sunstein 2007) that seems to be more persuasive and acceptable in modern, well-functioning democracies.

Keywords: constitutional argumentation, hard cases, legal argumentation theory, incompletely theorized agreement, abstract values

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THE STAGING OF “SAID ETHOS” IN AN ARGUMENTATIVE FRAMEWORK

There is hardly any doubt that ethos has a persuasive potential that remains central to many contemporary persuasion techniques. As ethos, in principle, is “achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak” (*Rhet*, 1355b10), it is the conclusion of an inferential process, which can be described as an abduction (Eco, 1992; Peirce, 1932): the linguistic details and features of a text give rise to one or many tacit inferential process(es) whose conclusion is that the speaker appears to be “trustworthy”, for example. In other words, the study of ethos requires an understanding of how linguistic resources help speakers establish their character.

I have recently proposed a methodological tool of different sub-types of ethos recently, based on the distinction between “shown” and “said” ethos (Ducrot 1980, Author 2022). I would like to focus my attention on the latter category during this talk and present the six subtypes of it: individual, collective, confronted, *a contrario*, borrowed and neutralized ethos. Indeed, the said ethos, rarely studied elsewhere, offers interesting problems regarding inferences and argumentation. How does one arrive at certain conclusions about the speaker’s trustworthiness, benevolence, or competence? Does the direct ethos - talking about oneself, talking about a group in which the speaker is part of (individual and collective ethos)- function differently from the indirect ethos: talking about others? In particular, is the notion of commitment the same in both cases? We will ask these types of questions on one example: a recent Kamala Harris’ statement about Tyre Nichols (January 2023) to test the model and to reflect on these questions that oscillate between rhetoric and argumentation.

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WARRANTS, CONCLUSIONS, AND THE DECEPTIVENESS OF STRUCTURE

In making an argument we assert five things:

1. That the premise is true
2. That the warrant is true
3. That the conclusion is true
4. That the warrant justifies the conclusion from the premise
5. That the conclusion is relevant

All five are asserted individually and it is not possible to know which of the five is the real 'claim' being made. It might be any or all of them. Is it right then to name the conclusion as the standpoint or claim or assertion? One particular sentence plays the role of conclusion in the structure of the argument, but the truth of the conclusion may not be the proposition which the arguer is motivated to support in making his argument.

I suggest that in many argumentative exchanges, the real point which the speaker wishes to convey is his adherence to the warrant, or major premise, of the argument, not the conclusion. In fact, he may well be happy to concede the conclusion as long as the truth of the warrant claim continues to be recognised. This is so because warrants as general beliefs are often linked to features of identity and worldview, whereas individual facts represented as data premises, and thus the conclusions which they support, are more easily discarded. Warrants illustrate both our character and our wisdom: conclusions drawn from them are relatively arbitrary. So, while it may be the case that we argue because we seek adherence to the conclusion, or standpoint, we may equally be seeking adherence to the method of reasoning applied in getting there.

I make this point with the help of various examples and draw parallels with other aspects of arguer identity and self-perception.

Keywords: argument structure, arguer identity, arguer motivation, arguer worldview, warrants

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REPHRASE TYPES IN ARGUMENTATION: CORPORA AND ANALYTICS

The recent work on rephrase in argumentation focuses on developing (i) experiments to collect empirical evidence for persuasive effects of rephrased arguments (e.g., Schumann et al. 2021), and (ii) the study of linguistic manifestations of rephrase (e.g., Konat et al., 2016; Visser et al., 2018; Koszowy et al., 2022). The work presented in this talk will concentrate on the latter strand by proposing a study of linguistic manifestations of various rephrase types. To this end, we will discuss the process of building the corpora of annotated rephrase types for the future purpose of designing rephrase analytics.

The classification we propose differentiates rephrase types on the basis of their illocutionary intentions grasped by the PICDO scheme, such as illustrating, clarifying or intensifying (Kiljan and Koszowy, 2022). Our pilot study of rephrase types consisted of employing the PICDO scheme for re-annotating two existing corpora created with OVA+, Online Visualisation of Arguments software: the corpus of transcribed US 2016 televised Presidential Debates, and the corpus of COVID-19 vaccines discussions on Reddit. This study allowed us to gather initial linguistic evidence for frequencies of rephrase kinds (e.g., the category of “illustrating” being the prevalent type occupying almost 49% of all rephrase instances in the US 2016 corpus and over 63% in the Reddit-vaccine corpus).

Based on this research, we will elaborate on the PICDO annotation scheme in order to specify more rephrase categories and create a new corpora of annotated rephrase types that would adequately represent main ways of uttering rephrase. This study helps us propose a rephrase analytics method to explore the dynamics of persuasive uses of specific kinds of rephrase. It will be further investigated how this study is going to provide some key linguistic evidence for the further design of experiments on the persuasiveness of particular rephrase types.

Keywords: rephrasing, rephrased arguments, types of rephrase, annotation, corpora, corpus linguistics

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EVOCATION OF RELEVANT QUESTIONS — CORPUS INSIGHTS

There are gaps in our knowledge, and we are aware of this. In order to fill these gaps, we ask questions (this remark has been put forward already by Aristotle). We do not ask them randomly: if our goal is to address the knowledge gap, we ask questions relevant to the issue at hand. The research presented in this paper models such process of goal-directed question asking.

We focus on the concept of *evocation* of a question Q by a set X of declarative sentences. Q is evoked by X just in case two conditions are met: (i) truth of all the elements of X warrants the existence of a true direct answer to Q , but (ii) no single direct answer to Q is entailed by X . Evocation is a very useful concept in addressing the issues of modelling dynamics of information processing. However, the basic version gives rise to some troubling issues related to the possible lack of relevance between Q and X . In order to address these issues, we develop a version of evocation rooted in situational semantics, construed set-theoretically. Such a basis, more fine-grained than the standard truth-values based approach, offers the possibility of defining the notion of relevance in a precise way. As a result, we introduce versions of the concept of evocation that are more sensitive to a number of both semantic and pragmatic phenomena manifesting themselves in the natural language use of questions. Most notably, we define the concepts of relevance and compatibility of sentences and texts, as well as both strong and weak versions of evocation of relevant and compatible questions. We examine relations between these different versions and test their accuracy and usefulness on natural language data.

This study demonstrates how various modes of relevant evocation facilitates adequate modelling of question processing in real-life dialogues and argumentation processes and thus, supports comprehension in communication. We test our model using examples from the British National Corpus.

Keywords: questions, relevance, situational semantics, inferential erotetic logic

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**TELL YOUR GRANDMA TO SUCK EGGS:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY INTO ARGUMENTATIVE MANSPLAINING**

The phenomenon of mansplaining, first described by American writer Rebecca Solnit in an essay titled “Men Explain Things to Me” in 2008, is the perceived arrogance and false sense of superiority of men when explaining things to female audiences. Although the term “mansplaining” has gained immense popularity in everyday vernacular as well as social and popular media, Johnson et al. (2021) point out that there is a severe lack of academic literature dedicated to unpacking the phenomenon.

The present research was designed to address this gap in the literature and widen the academic understanding of the concept. The focus is on the reception and reaction to mansplaining, as it investigates how mansplaining might change the perception of a given speaker. By shedding light on the experience of being mansplained to, we aim to provide valuable insights into this sociocultural issue and inspire further academic research in the area.

In this talk, instead of studying the phenomenon of mansplaining understood as providing a superfluous explanation, we investigated what we call ‘argumentative mansplaining’, which we define as providing superfluous argumentation. In particular, we have carried out an empirical study presenting participants with short dialogues in which someone continues to provide support for their initial claim when the addressee has already explicitly accepted the claim that is supported by these arguments. We took the participants taking the role of an overhearer or listener in the conversations used as stimuli. In our presentation of the results of this study, we focus on the extent to which the performance of this type of argumentative mansplaining influences the perceived intelligence, perceived likeability, as well as the perceived masculinity or femininity of the speaker.

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**ASSESSING SEMANTIC ARGUMENTS AND PERSUASIVE DEFINITIONS:
HOW TO DEAL WITH TRUE PEACE, TRUE RACISM, AND TRUE FEMINISM**

When analysing the legal, scientific, or political discourse, but also the everyday life arguments or advertisements one will notice that there is a type of arguing which is based on modifying the meaning of a term in order to support conclusion. Such type of argument is called semantic, and it was well described in several papers in many journals dedicated to logic and argumentation. This notion seems to be promising for the logical, legal philosophical and rhetorical analysis, yet it received little attention in the past. Of course, there were few significant contributions to the semantic aspect of argument in works of Charles Stevenson, Chaïm Perelman, or Tadeusz Pawłowski in the mid-twentieth century, but none of them has not put it together in order to build a model of arguments based on the modification of meaning. Yet the model of semantic argument seems not be complete. This paper may be considered as a continuation of this project—the model of semantic argument requires the criteria of correctness.

We may certainly identify the examples of semantic arguments, which can be evaluated positively, that is, which seem to be valid and sound as well. We may also find other semantic arguments, which are obviously poor, deceiving, weak or invalid. Starting from this very fact, that we are able to determine the strength of certain semantic arguments and intuitively evaluate them as acceptable or not, we may initiate the investigation of the criteria for evaluating this type of arguments.

This paper is aimed to formulate such criteria and verify them in a few case studies of semantic arguments. Therefore, we will start with the brief introduction of the concept of semantic arguments and its typology which was already described in detail. Then we move to the initial analysis of a few examples of semantic arguments, in which we will attempt to evaluate them. Subsequently, we then formulate the criteria of correctness. The paper includes a few detailed case studies of the (re)definitions of racism, war, peace, and feminism, which were used to formulate semantic arguments. Basing on these examples, we formulated and tested five criteria, which may be formulated in critical questions.

Keywords: argument from definition, argument from verbal classification; criteria of correctness; persuasive definition; semantic argument

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**MULTIDIMENSIONAL META-ARGUMENTATIVE ANALYSIS OF
DISAGREEMENTS - SELECTED CASE STUDIES**

In this paper we propose a method which allows for multidimensional meta-argumentative representation of public debates. The model involves deontic, ontological, and ethical aspects. These three axes determine the crucial dimensions of the discussion, which are brought about by relevant questions. Ontological axis is focused on the questions concerning facts (“Is X the case?”). Ethical axis captures concerns about ethical and moral standpoints regarding a given issue (“Is X good or fair or just?”). Deontological axis represents practical reasoning in the sense that it is focused on actual doings of parties (“Should X be done?”). Their intersections represent issues being considered within the discussion, each of which may be approached from one of these three perspectives. We reconstruct the public debate in the tree-like structure representing the meta-level of argumentation. The point of departure is the time-line of events concerning a given topic. Nodes of the resulting tree-like structure are questions, representing the consecutive issues being considered. The rationale for a question to appear in the structure is based either on the relation of dependency between questions or on the presence of an appropriate external non-linguistic feeder (action or event). We will illustrate such analyses with case studies of the Turów mine dispute (between Poland and Czech Republic) as well as the debates concerning the so-called Lex Czarnek (educational reform) and the abortion law changes in Poland.

Keywords: question dependency, question feeders, public debate, disagreements

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ON HYPOCRISY

A hypocritical argument is an argument that uses a concept C to argue against use of that very concept C (example: ‘we ought not use OUGHT’). Should we accept hypocritical arguments? My response has a negative and a positive part. In the negative part I argue against the view that hypocrisy is unproblematic because it can be reframed as a form of *reductio*, or because it can be understood according to the Wittgensteinian metaphor of kicking away a ladder upon climbing it (Burgess and Plunkett 2013, Burgess 2020). I argue that these attempts to absolve hypocrisy fail because hypocrisy cannot be wholly explained along these lines. In the positive part I outline an alternative view: some, but not all, instances of hypocrisy are unacceptable. The unacceptable instances of hypocrisy are not merely about doing something you said you ought not do; they are about doing something you said you ought not do, and the fact of your doing so undermines the argument. There are two ways that this can be the case: (1) hypocrisy is evidence that the view advocated for is difficult to implement, and (2) hypocrisy is evidence that some premises are false. Despite these problems, I argue that hypocrisy is unlikely to pose deep methodological challenges to conceptual engineers because we have no reason to believe that hypocritical arguments are common in conceptual engineering.

Keywords: conceptual engineering, hypocrisy, argumentation, informal logic, methodology, tu quoque

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